390.1115A/12–544: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 6—11:02 a.m.]
1951. The enemy is approaching Kweiyang. If and when it is captured it seems likely that the enemy’s efforts will then be directed against Kunming although his intentions are of course unknown. In a direct line Kweiyang is closer to Chungking than is Kunming. We do not wish to be alarmists but it seems clear to us that the time has come to take precautionary measures and prepare as best we can for such contingencies as may arise.
- 1.
- In consultation with Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer it has been decided to begin as quietly as possible to evacuate nonessential civilian Americans from Chungking to India.
- According to our figures there are 71 non-Government American civilians in Chungking and 45 American Government civilian personnel exclusive of the Embassy.
- 2.
- Looking to the possibilities of the future, we are coordinating the Embassy’s evacuation plan with that of the Army, the latter including evacuation of Government civilian personnel other than those who may proceed elsewhere by motor car or Navy truck. General Wedemeyer feels that the retention of some OWI27a personnel will be useful to his headquarters but that in the kind of emergency which, if it occurs, we envisage there is no essential service for our Military Forces to be performed by FEA27b personnel. We request clear and specific authority to issue appropriate evacuation instructions, in consultation with General Wedemeyer, to all American Government civilian personnel in this area. We also request that for time being at least, Department hold in abeyance departure for this area of further Government civilian personnel. We are requesting Delhi and consular offices in India not to give clearance to American civilians desiring to proceed to China.
- 3.
- We do not have definitive information as to plans of Chinese Government if the emergency develops and it is possible that the Government [Page 200] itself does not yet have definitive plans. The most talked of possible new location for the Government or part of it are Hsichang (also called Ningyuan) in Sikong and Lanchow. One story is that both places may be utilized. From all accounts Hsichang would be a highly unsatisfactory place; it is not considered defensible; it is said to be lacking in food supplies; surrounding tribespeople are said to be unfriendly and possibly hostile. There is, however, an airstrip there.
We do not know whether the President will wish the Ambassador to follow the Government farther into the interior. We assume that the Department will wish part of the Embassy staff to follow the Government and our evacuation plan, based on that assumption, contemplates that as a minimum the Counselor, a China language staff officer, a code clerk and stenographer, a Chinese interpreter, the Military and Air Attachés and 2 assistants, the Naval Attaché together with an assistant and 4 radiomen will follow the Government.
Regards archives, we propose shipping nonconfidential files if possible to India and destroying confidential files, extra codes and the rotors to the large code machines. It seems preferable to destroy true readings of secret telegrams to risking their falling into enemy hands through possible air casualty. We propose also to obtain from the Army Finance officer, against official debit, a considerable reserve supply of American currency as there is every likelihood that in the possible emergency we have in mind, Chinese national currency will become next to useless. Extra funds will also be necessary for payment of Chinese staff and authorization is requested to pay their transportation expenses to place of safety in China.