Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

867N.01/12–2344

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[Washington,] December 23, 1944.

Mr. Murray: I had the memorandum you prepared on Palestine with me when I saw the President yesterday. When I mentioned the subject, he complimented us on the fine manner in which this problem had been handled in his absence and then expressed the hope that he would not have to get into it again for some time. It therefore seemed inappropriate for me to bring up your memorandum and I think we should not send it over for the time being. It can be worked into our general preparation for what is ahead which we shall be undertaking on a broad scale in the Department in the next few weeks.

E[dward] S[tettinius]

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt ⁸¹

Washington [undated].

I believe the time has come when we should decide upon the next step to be taken with respect to the Palestine problem. After consultation within the Department, I submit herewith, for your consideration, a course of action in regard to Palestine in view of the projected meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.⁸²

[Subannex]

Suggested Procedure Regarding the Palestine Question⁸³

In determining what action should be taken in regard to the Palestine question, the following are the principal factors to be considered:

1. The Department’s policy up to the present time has been directed primarily at forestalling any action which would be likely to create a situation in the Near East that would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in that area.

This preventive policy cannot be continued indefinitely. The adoption of a more positive policy is clearly desirable. The coming meeting would seem to be the appropriate time to initiate such a policy.

2. Ibn Saud and the heads of other Governments in the Near East have been informed, with the President’s concurrence, that it is the view of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be made without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

3. The British Government has officially stated that it will not enter into commitments regarding the future of Palestine without prior consultations with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom it may judge to be concerned.

4. Soviet officials have stated recently that the Soviet Government does not favor the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

In view of the foregoing factors, it would be inadvisable for the United States at the present time to take a definite attitude toward the future of Palestine. It also follows that it would be inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to undertake any long-range settlement for Palestine without the approval of the Soviet Government. We should not give the Soviet Government an opportunity to augment its influence in the Near East by championing the cause of the Arabs at the expense of the United States or at the expense of both the United States and Great Britain.

It would be inadvisable, also, to discuss, or for any of the three great powers to formulate, a Palestine settlement until there has been full consultation with both Arabs and Jews in accordance with commitments made both by us and the British. It is therefore suggested that the President might raise at the forthcoming meeting the question of initiating consultations with Arabs and Jews and representatives of the three religions interested in Palestine. Specifically it is proposed that the British Government be asked to take steps to implement its commitment to consult Arabs and Jews and other interested parties by inviting them to present their views regarding a Palestine settlement in writing to the British Government.

The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposal for a Palestine settlement, which would have concurrence of the three great powers. This body of material might be presented, at an appropriate time after the cessation of hostilities, to any future international conference at which a Palestine settlement was under consideration.

It is thought that the present unprofitable and increasingly dangerous activities of both Arab and Jewish pressure groups would in part be checked, if all the interested groups were to occupy themselves with the organization and presentation of proposals to the British Government with respect to the post-war settlement for Palestine.

It is thought, also, that this procedure would give the more moderate and less vociferous groups among both Arabs and Jews, who now lack the means to present their views, an opportunity to do so officially. It would also make it possible for ecclesiastical organizations with important interests in the Palestine settlement to give expression to their views in regard to the future of the Holy Land.

In view of the widespread humanitarian interest in the fate of Jews whose lives are or may be jeopardized in Axis Europe, the British should at the same time be asked to consider formulating and announcing the immigration policy which they will pursue in Palestine between the time when the White Paper quota becomes exhausted and the time when a long-range settlement of the Palestine question becomes operative.

81. Marginal notation on the original: “Held for preparation. Not sent.”
82. A reference to the forthcoming Conference at Yalta, February 4–11, 1945. Documentation on this Conference is printed in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945; no record has been found of discussion regarding Palestine at the Conference.
83. Marginal notation on the original: “Not sent.”