867N.01–/12–1344: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 71
[Received December 14—6:50 a.m.]
4812. ReDeptel 2757, November 30, 2 p.m.72 The Embassy has little direct information other than that already available to the Department of the Soviet attitude toward Palestine, Zionism, the Arab union movement, and Soviet policies generally on Near Eastern questions. We have however come to the following conclusions based on the information available and the general trends of Soviet policy:
Specifically regarding the conversation of Mr. Hirschmann with the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara covered by the Department’s instruction to Moscow No. 346 of November 773 we have every reason to believe that the Soviet official correctly interpreted Soviet policy toward an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the Soviet attitude generally toward the Jewish question. The absence of editorial comment in the Soviet press on these questions leads to the conclusion that either the Soviet Government considers it premature to take a definite position or that a definite line has not yet been established on the highest [apparent omission]. It may be assumed however that the newly established diplomatic missions in Arab countries are privately circulating the views expressed by the Soviet official. The aims would appear clear, namely to create an atmosphere of friendship for the Soviet Union in the Arab world, to break down existing suspicions of and hostility to Soviet Communist doctrine, and to obtain Arab support in furthering any specific Soviet objective which may develop. Mr. Shchiborin, recently appointed Soviet Minister to Egypt, has guardedly questioned me regarding the campaign statements of the President and Dewey in respect to Palestine and indicated [Page 647] that he was familiar with the adverse reaction among Arabs. I doubt whether the Soviet Government wishes to come out openly against American and British policies in this connection at this time. On the other hand we may be sure that the Soviets will use this issue to increase Soviet influence to the detriment of Great Britain and the United States among the Arab states. The reason for Soviet reluctance to come out in the open may be their consistent desire not to weaken the relationships with their major Allies in the prosecution of the war and for the peace, and also the Soviets may wish to await a more precise formulation of American and British policy on Palestine. A step for increasing Soviet prestige in the Arab world has been the development of the recently established diplomatic missions in Arab states. The activities of these missions can best be reported by our own diplomatic missions in these localities. It may be expected however that the size and competence of these missions will expand and the penetration of Soviet concepts and accomplishments increase. The affinity with the Moslems in the Soviet Union will be emphasized and Soviet success in improving the economic situation of these people will undoubtedly be effectively used. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Soviets appear to be using the close affinity of the various peoples within the Soviet Union with those of the Near and Middle East to provide convenient channels of contact. These include the Armenian, Azerbaijanian, and Turko-Tartar peoples, as well as in the religious field the Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem have recently been invited to attend the forthcoming election of the new Russian Patriarch. Although the Soviets may find it difficult to support all of these conflicting groups it is in accordance with Soviet tactics to cultivate them all in order to break down the prejudices of a generation and to create sympathetic interest in the Soviet Union.
On the Arab union movement there has been only one brief item in the press reporting the establishment of the league of independent Arab countries at the Alexandria conference last October.74 The Soviet attitude probably conforms to the general Soviet view on the subject of international blocs: Favorable if the Soviet Union can dominate the bloc, strongly opposed if it is outside the orbit of Soviet influence or potentially directed against the Soviet Union. The absence of Soviet editorial comment on the Arab union movement accordingly indicates that the Soviet Union either feels that the league will not operate in such a manner as to affect Soviet interests adversely or that through increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world it may be useful in the furtherance of Soviet interests.
[Page 648]A fuller report discussing Soviet policy toward the individual countries of the Near and Middle East follows by air.75 Since this message was called for by the Department, I have not repeated it to other missions and leave it to the Department to make such distribution of it as it sees fit.
- Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 19 (not printed).↩
- Not printed; it repeated a request made initially in telegram 2591, November 2, 11 p.m., to Moscow (see footnote 47, p. 633).↩
- Not printed; see footnote 47, p. 633.↩
- See bracketed note, p. 660.↩
- Despatch 1319, December 20, not printed.↩