I do not know what the General actually said to the Senators beyond
his statement to me that he had followed the general facts and tone
of this memorandum, so I assume that it can be safely treated as a
basis for the remarks which he made.
Mr. Bloom, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House, has asked me to advise him informally of about what I would
say if I were called upon to testify before his Committee, and I
propose to testify in conformity with this memorandum.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
War (McCloy) to the Chief
of Staff (Marshall)
[Washington,] 22 February
1944.
I believe the Secretary before he went away arranged with
Wadsworth that an officer to be selected by you and I should
attend an Executive Meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee
of the House in connection with the pending Palestine
resolution. It was originally
[Page 575]
arranged that this meeting should take
place on Tuesday of this week but it has been postponed until
Thursday. Mr. Wadsworth has advised me that the meeting will now
take place some time Thursday morning.
In preparation for this meeting I have read the old resolution of
192242 and compared it with the pending
resolution. I have also talked to some G–243 officers and gone over some reports,
and I intend to testify in general along the following line:
The pending resolution deals with highly controversial issues in
that it comes out for unlimited immigration into the area, a
matter definitely in sharp issue, as well as for the
establishment of a Jewish state as distinguished from a
homeland. It also requires that the United States take
“appropriate measures” to bring these things about. Our G–2
reports all indicate that there is a high degree of tension in
Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews and that each side have
substantial quantities of arms. Bombings have occurred in the
Migration Offices maintained by the British Government in Haifa,
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Any action which would tend to increase
this tension or threaten an outbreak in this area would greatly
compromise our military capacities. Among other considerations
there are the following:
- 1.
- There are substantial Allied forces in that area which
we are seeking to reduce and any outbreak at this
particular time would be certain to pin down troops for
garrison duty that are badly needed for replacement and
other duty both in Italy and for other
operations.
- 2.
- Our military forces are in contact with the Moslem
world not only in Palestine but throughout the entire
Mediterranean area and in many places further east. The
Palestine issue is a source of more or less concern to
all the Moslem population of the Near East and North
Africa. The tribes in Morocco are restive and already
disturbances have occurred there. These activities are
mainly pointed against French dominion but it is known
that German agents are active in the area and certainly
will use the Arab-Jew issue to the limit in order to
foment further disturbances if an opportunity presents
itself.
- 3.
- We are dependent not only upon peace in the area but
our lines of communication throughout Africa are to an
important degree dependent upon the cooperation and
goodwill of the Arab. His willingness to supply goods
and services in furtherance of the Allied effort is a
matter of real military importance.
- 4.
- The strategic supply routes to Russia via the Persian
Gulf as well as the supply routes to the Far East run
through Moslem territory and would be subject to
constant threat of sabotage and disruption in the event
of any disturbances or hostilities. There are Allied
Moslem troops scattered throughout the area on whom we
depend for active operations as well as supply. Such
troops are in Italy at the present time and we intend to
use them elsewhere.
- 5.
- The Near East is an important supply base for European
operations. Any threat to it is a great military
concern, particularly in respect of oil and aviation
gasoline supply. The existing pipeline from Iraq to
Palestine could be cut or damaged as it has been in the
past. This naturally affects naval and military
operations in the Mediterranean which depend on the
Haifa refinery for their oil. The Abadan refinery at the
head of the Gulf is the only Allied source of aviation
gasoline outside the Western Hemisphere. The distances
are great and the supply and installations in many
places are highly vulnerable. It would require a
substantial number of troops to protect them in the
event of disorders.
I do not intend to exaggerate the consequences which would flow
from the adoption of this resolution as I can not be certain
that all these results will flow, but from the foregoing
considerations I think it is quite apparent that from a military
point of view we would much prefer to let such sleeping dogs
lie.
I have debated whether to refer to the pending negotiations for
the laying of an oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to
the Mediterranean44 as there may be some controversial aspects to
this question. However, Secretary Ickes45 indicated that the primary
purpose of this new pipeline was to provide a reserve of one
billion gallons of oil for the United States Army and Navy. I
doubt that we could get very far with these negotiations if this
issue is agitated in the United States. My rather strong
inclination is not to bring this up, however.
The one thing that I imagine we will be pressed for will be to
suggest a form of resolution which will not be provocative and
which will not in our judgment induce the disorders that we
fear. This is a matter on which I feel we should be most
reluctant to express any view. What is provocative or
unprovocative in the Palestine problem is a political matter on
which the State Department rather than the War Department should
speak. It has been pointed out to us by the State Department
that this resolution does embody burning issues. What lesser
position might be taken without offence is not a matter for
military determination, but from a military standpoint I think
we can and should say that we would be in favor of taking any
steps which would postpone without prejudice to either side this
issue for determination after the war when military
considerations will be less acute.
The State Department has furnished us with a telegram conveying
expressions from the Governor [Government] of Iraq to the effect
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that German agents in the area are using
as propaganda against the Allied effort the existence of this
resolution.
General Bissell is prepared to go up and give in very general
terms the disposition of troops in the area and generally
buttress by factual data statements made along the above
lines.
I am going to emphasize that I am dealing with the matter purely
from the point of view of military considerations and that is
the limit of my competence.
I attach hereto a copy of the resolution together with a copy of
Secretary Stimson’s letter to Senator Connally.45a
I would like to know how you make out.
