Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

881.01/11–2544: Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

Tangier, November 25, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received November 27—12:20 p.m.]

345. Madrid’s 152, November 20.⁹⁸ 1. Our nonparticipation in the international administration was due fundamentally to a foreign policy of isolation which time has presumably rendered invalid. It is difficult to believe we would continue to maintain a position of non-participation in a future international regime for Tangier if as is assumed we are to share responsibilities in the control of strategic parts of the world among which Tangier is of conspicuous importance. I can perceive no useful purpose in refraining now from joining with the other principally interested parties in an approach to Spain concerning the termination of the special mission assumed by the Spanish in Tangier.

2. My understanding of the Department’s motives in taking cognizance in November 1940 of the Spanish unilateral action in Tangier is that notwithstanding fact that we were not a party to the Tangier Statute it was felt that already in 1940 our relation to world political problems had so changed and Tangier had become of such strategic importance to us as a great maritime power as to make it at that time of vital importance in the national interest to assert our views with respect to Tangier and to serve notice on Spain that our interests in this area were not to be ignored.

3. Our note to Spanish Government in November ’40⁹⁹ specifically stipulated we would not recognize any unilateral action taken by Spain with reference to Tangier.

4. The accumulating force of our interest in this area was evidenced by the energetic protest made in ’41 in connection with Spain’s unilateral action in taking over the Cape Spartel lighthouse.

I am still of the opinion as expressed in the memorandum of March 2, ’44 enclosed with Department’s instruction 176 of April 14, ’44¹ that a suitable moment, i.e. on the eve of the close of hostilities in Europe, the Spanish Government should be approached by the American and British Governments with reference to Tangier. The joint or identic démarches might recall that in June ’40 in communications made in Madrid and Tangier (see enclosures to Tangier despatch 1545, June 15, ’40² and Madrid’s telegram 192, June 14, ’40³) the Spanish Government gave notice of its intention to occupy the Tangier Zone provisionally to insure its neutrality and that the Spanish Government’s task in the opinion of the interested powers has now ended and that the continued Spanish occupancy of Tangier is considered inconsistent with the aims and purposes of the United Nations as expressed in the Atlantic Charter⁴ and other declarations as well as in the Stimson Doctrine⁵ (see last paragraph on page 1 of the section headed “Provisional Interim Regime” in the memorandum on the future status of the International Zone of Tangier enclosed in the instruction mentioned). In view of the changed position of France since that memo was written it may be desirable that France be associated in the démarche. The Department will doubtless also desire to keep Russia informed as well as those powers belonging to the United Nations or benevolently neutral nations who by virtue of their adherence to the Tangier Statute or the international instruments relating to Morocco are entitled to be informed of our intentions.

Repeated to Paris and Madrid.

Childs

98. See last paragraph of the telegram supra.
99. For text of note, see telegram 297, November 9, 1940, 6 p.m., to Madrid, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, p. 789.
1. Not printed.
2. Not printed; see telegram 21, June 15, 1940, 11 a.m., from Tangier, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iii, p. 785.
3. ibid., p. 783.
4. Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, ibid., 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
5. See telegram 2, January 7, 1932, noon, to Nanking, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iii, p. 7. This telegram and a telegram the same mutatis mutandis to Tokyo instructed the presentation of notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments in which the statement was made that the United States would not recognize situations, treaties, or agreements brought about contrary to the obligations of the Pact of Paris. The Pact of Paris renounced war as an instrument of national policy and by its terms the contracting parties agreed never to seek the settlement of disputes among them except by peaceful means. For text of this Pact, signed August 27, 1928, see Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.