868.00/12–2544: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 26—1:04 p.m.]
1911. Reference my 1750 December 14, 3 p.m. Macmillan has informed Churchill that 2 weeks have passed since he proposed to Churchill that the Archbishop of Athens be appointed regent by the King. He stated that if the King had accepted the advice which Churchill and Eden had offered him there probably would be peace by now and fewer British lives would have been sacrificed. Macmillan said that he thought the King never grasped this fact and has considered the Greek question too much from the point of view of the interests of his dynasty.
Macmillan added that he hardly needed to remind Churchill that the King had a very difficult and illuminating experience with Greek politicians before he allowed control of the country to be taken over by Metaxas. This experience was repeated in the critical days after the death of Metaxas when the Nazis approached Athens. Macmillan stated that the King must know therefore that even in a severe crisis the advice of these politicians is apt to be uncertain. He pointed out that in the present situation the Ministers who advised the King not to agree to the regency felt so secure behind British bayonets that they preferred to remain in office and maintain their present course rather than risk the appointment of a man who might take a wider view and work for reconciliation, perhaps unseating them in the process. He stated that these motives perhaps played the major part in the advice which these politicians gave to the King. The British Resident Minister went on to say in his communication to the Prime Minister that in consequence of this the British are left with no person in authority to bring the two sides together while the fortunes of the Greek state grow more and more precarious. He said he had reported separately on economic and financial prospects which were bad enough, but stated that if the civil war continues much longer the Greeks may find it very difficult to win back Macedonia which is the “happy hunting ground” of various kinds of Slav insurgents whose infiltrations the British are unable to control and which the Kremlin shows no apparent desire to control. He added that the retention of Macedonia is vital to the Greek state with its [Page 168] present population and since the growth of the population after the influx of refugees from Turkey, Greece cannot recover without Macedonia. Churchill was also informed by Macmillan that the reason he thought the Archbishop could secure peace was because he not only had the confidence of a large circle among party politicians but he was trusted by the people in many walks of life aside from the politicians. This applied especially to people with Leftist sympathies who have no association with the Communists and are alarmed by the present strife in Greece.
Macmillan stated that if the Archbishop is appointed regent, he intended to invite General Plastiras to be Prime Minister and form a government of personalities outside of party politicians who would be representative of many shades of political opinions and who would be respected. The Archbishop’s answer to the Communist Party would be that no party was directly representative in the Government. He stated that as the parties today have no means of substantiating press reports which they enjoyed in the country [sic], the Archbishop’s idea of a “caretaker government” until elections is a wise and proper answer. In Macmillan’s opinion this procedure would give an opportunity for a new start.
Macmillan stated that he felt that so much was at stake for the British as well as for the Greeks and the need was so urgent that he begged the Prime Minister to do everything in his power to persuade the King to give a favorable decision without further delay.
Macmillan stated that the noise of battle in Athens day by day for nearly 3 weeks is a very strong reminder of the havoc being caused morally and materially by the unhappy and divided Greek people. He said that if there is a man who can rescue the Greek people from all this, he should be given a chance at once. He added that Damoskinos himself is convinced that he can succeed.
Field Marshal Alexander who is now in Athens stated before his departure 2 days ago that he had sent a message to the War Cabinet stating that peaceful settlement of the Greek affair must be made as soon as possible as with the forces at his disposal for operations in Greece, he could not undertake more than the pacification of the Athens-Piraeus area and would be remiss in his duty if he did not say to the War Cabinet that it would be futile for the British to attempt to control Greece by armed force. He repeated again the remark he has made on several occasions that, after all the Nazis could not do it with infinitely more forces than the British had at their disposal and even the Nazis had to make political deals.
Military reports received today indicate that while British troops continue to make progress in the Athens-Piraeus area, there is stiff fighting in Epirus where Zervas’ forces continue to withdraw towards the coast.
[Page 169]I understand that as a result of these reports to London from Macmillan and SAC64 Churchill may “take charge” of Greek situation.
- Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Field Marshal Alexander).↩