Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.00112 European War 1939/9–444: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 4, 1944—8 p.m.
[Received September 5—8:48 a.m.]

3476. When Foreign Minister Günther and Mr. Boheman had handed British Minister and me the reply to our démarche, paraphrase of which is sent in my immediately following telegram No. 3477, September 4, 9 p.m.,⁷⁰ Mr. Günther asked us to read it. Mr. Boheman then said that he would like to make the following official comments: (1) Actual Swedish trade today with Germany is very small. The withdrawal of Swedish shipping from that trade had a far more pronounced effect than its previous proportion to the total trade would indicate. German tonnage now in the trade with Sweden is very much less than it has been previously although this Boheman stated was not unexpected; they had believed that this shipping would be largely withdrawn as in fact it has been for other purposes. With today’s news of cessation of hostilities between Russia and Finland⁷¹ the Finnish shipping is also out of German Swedish trade. There only remain a few German ships and some others including Danish, all in greatly decreased quantity to the normal figures. For several days now there has not been a single ship at Lulea or Oxelosund to take on iron ore although the Germans have announced that 12 will be sent to Lulea and 5 to Oxelosund. These 17 ships according to Boheman would represent a tonnage of about 60,000 which is much less than the previous average and he says that they would represent all shipping for that traffic to the Baltic ports for the entire month of September. They have not yet arrived there or even been dispatched according to Swedish information. Foreign Office is of the opinion that other events may soon happen which would have such an influence on German and German controlled shipping to Sweden as to reduce it almost to a vanishing point.

(2) He says that transit of all war material which goes to German occupied Finland has now stopped. Boheman stated that the question of the cessation of the remaining traffic of the same kind to Norway is under serious consideration now by the Government. He was referring to the 120,000 tons conceded by the terms of the Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement. The inference was that the transit to Norway will likewise be completely stopped.

Boheman then went on to say that the Allies have often expressed their view that Sweden should make clear her stand in regard to Nazi Germany and that if she did so it would among other things have a strong influence in the direction of forcing Finland to get out of the war. In this connection Boheman pointed out that the Finns have often advanced as one of their main difficulties in attempting to get peace with Russia their precarious situation. Sweden recently, as we know, has informed the Finns that Sweden would supply Finnish food requirements to the necessary extent in the event that the Finns come to an understanding with Russia. This assurance from the Swedish Government Boheman stated has great influence on the Finnish decision. Boheman also drew attention to the reservation made by Sweden at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement that if the situation should change as far as the position of the northern countries was concerned she would reserve the right to export certain necessary commodities to the northern countries. The present assurance to Finland in regard to food is in line with this Swedish reservation and the Swedes have therefore not thought it necessary to consult with us prior to the decision. Full details of all exportations under this obligation will however be given to us through the Joint Standing Commission.

Mr. Günther then asked me what I thought of the reply. I told him that frankly speaking I was certain that it would be a disappointment to my Government; that what we had expected from the Swedish Government in reply to the joint démarche was an action which would be a clear affirmation of where Sweden’s sympathies lay in the present war; that the moment had come when Sweden could take such action without risk of an overwhelming attack from our enemy and that an opportunity had been afforded for Sweden to give public expression to the feeling which we knew the country had always had. Mr. Günther replied that he understood our reasoning but that it was not the viewpoint of the Swedish Government. He said that from the Swedish view it was not a question of whether there was the slightest danger from Germany nor of even seizing the occasion to proclaim to the world a fact which according to Mr. Günther should be well known—that Sweden has no sympathy and has never had any sympathy with Nazi Germany. Sweden’s position is not a thing which can be lightly repudiated without an overt act having been taken against this country. Mr. Günther then argued that although he understood our point of view that the Swedish trade with Germany now remaining still contributed to the resistance of the enemy and thereby to lengthening of the war, he could not personally agree with that opinion. Both the British Minister and I replied that our highest military authorities were of a contrary opinion and that even if that trade contributed to the lengthening of the war by only one day or one hour it should be stopped. I remarked that they could not expect our military authorities to be satisfied with anything less than total cessation of all trade with Germany. Boheman then intimated that the Swedish Government would in fact eventually go much nearer to meeting our requests in entirety than we possibly even imagined. The minute anything happened in one of the northern countries (he was obviously referring to Denmark and Norway) we would find that Swedish actions would be completely inconsistent with neutrality. Mr. Boheman then made some remarks which I do not think had been contemplated but which occurred to his mind at the moment. He said he could not but believe that the technical neutrality of Sweden was something which brought substantial advantages to the Allies. Through the Swedish position as protecting power in many countries of the Soviet interests and the smaller Allies, Sweden had been in a position effectively to ameliorate the physical conditions of many Allied citizens and had in fact been able to save many lives. These were lives he observed as well as those of the soldiers whom we say are being killed because of Swedish material sent to Germany. He referred to various specific activities such as the exchange of war prisoners,⁷² Greek relief, et cetera, which could not have been undertaken if Sweden were not a neutral power. He then queried how the Allies would like to see Switzerland enter the war as an ally. What would become then of the vast machinery for the protection of our interests in enemy countries? The important work clone by Sweden for war prisoners would also be impossible if Sweden abandoned neutrality. Boheman queried whether abandonment of Swedish neutrality which would be the result of complete compliance with the joint request would be worth the sacrifice of the many activities in which Sweden is now engaged to our benefit. Both he and Mr. Günther emphasized that the Swedish insistence on maintaining consistent declared policy of neutrality was based on their Government’s conception of their duty to Sweden itself and had no relation to any form of obligation—moral or otherwise—to Nazi Germany which they frankly admitted did not exist nor to any apprehension of German counter measures.

My 1002, September 4, 8 p.m., repeats this to London.

Johnson

70. Not printed, but for text of Swedish reply, see infra.
71. On September 4, 1944, a cease fire order was obtained, and an armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on September 19. For correspondence on American relations with Finland, see vol. iii, pp. 556 ff.
72. For correspondence pertaining to the exchange of war prisoners, see vol. iii, pp. 785 ff. passim.