740.00112 European War 1939/8–1044: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:20 a.m.]
6395. From Riefler. Following is a paraphrase of a minute prepared by Mr. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of MEW, of the interview we had with Mr. Hägglöf this morning immediately following his return to London from Stockholm.
I can think of only two points in the very long interview which Mr. Foot neglected to mention. One was an inquiry by Mr. Hägglöf about our negotiations with Switzerland.19 He expressed great surprise that the Swiss had announced the conclusion of a new trade agreement with Germany at about the time when we were asking Sweden to make no new commitments to the Axis of any kind. We replied that the announcement of the new German-Swiss agreement, as given to the press in Bern, did not give correct impression of the actual diminution of Swiss exports to Germany, nor did it indicate the concessions that were being made to us. We told Mr. Hägglöf that we did not think that we were treating Switzerland more partially than Sweden.
When Mr. Hägglöf inquired about the possibility of securing an allocation of supplies after the close of hostilities, and we replied as [Page 602] noted in last paragraph of Mr. Foot’s minute, that under the present circumstances it would be futile to transmit such a request, Mr. Hägglöf turned to me and asked me directly whether in case Sweden should state, say, that all trade with Germany would be terminated as of tomorrow, would we then be willing to put up to the Combined Boards the question of postwar supplies to Sweden. I stated that under such a circumstance I would forward such a request.
(Begin paraphrase Foot’s minute.)
Yesterday Hägglöf returned from Sweden and this morning he came to see Mr. Riefler and me. He stated that immediately upon his return to Stockholm he had conversations with American and British Ministers in which suggestions put forward in our July 5 interview were discussed.20 Subsequently a number of unofficial discussions had taken place between him and Boheman on one hand, and Mallet and Johnson on the other. Everything which he could do he had done in order to bring our requests to Swedish Government’s attention. Swedish Government was unwilling to follow Turkey’s example21 and sever commercial relations completely at last moment when it was absolutely certain that imminent defeat faced Germany. Hägglöf had not been able to make much progress regarding proposal on shipping until he had managed to place question on technical level rather than political.
Foot and Riefler were then informed by Hägglöf of certain information they had already received; that is to say, Swedish Government intends to refuse to issue insurance for ships of Swedish registry sailing to certain ports in Germany, and to increase steadily number of ports under such prohibition. In Sweden marine insurance is in Government’s control, and it is impossible for risks to be covered anywhere else by Swedish shipowners.
Presently 300 Swedish ships are engaged in trading with ports in Germany. Of these 150 are small and 150 are large. Round trip on average from a Swedish to a German port and return takes 4 weeks approximately.
Insurance has not been issued for vessels of Swedish registry sailing to Rotterdam since last year. On August 4 insurance for ships sailing to Emden and Delfzyl in Holland had been refused. Emden had always been one of principal iron ore ports. Bremen and Hamburg are next in order, and it is Hägglöf’s opinion that some time this week prohibition will be applied to them. Result of foregoing would be end of all North Sea trade and in turn that amounts to greater part of trade between Sweden and Germany. Of Swedish ships engaged in iron ore traffic, 70 to 80 per cent sailed to ports in [Page 603] North Sea. On arrival there they loaded coal or alternatively went to Danzig and there took on coal cargoes.
It is intention that later on prohibition should be applied to ports in Baltic. Naturally all such development would depend upon military events should war take a different turn and, for example, should Russians be forced to withdraw, it would be necessary to change program. However, assuming continued Russian advance and continued increase in dangers to Swedish ships, in due course, all ports in Germany would be closed to Swedish trade. However, it is important that process take place step by step. Half of Swedish ships engaged in this traffic at any given moment are at ports in Germany, and due to congestion in these ports it is not easy to have loading expedited. Should a general ban be suddenly imposed by Swedes, Swedish ships in German ports might well be seized by Germans.
Foot stated that this danger was realized by him. Foot pointed out at same time that he hoped that it would not take long to complete process of extricating Swedish vessels. He thought that as a matter of friendly advice he should tell Hägglöf that sooner all ships of Swedish registry had returned to ports in Sweden, better it would be from all viewpoints. Should there be any doubts in Hägglöf’s mind about importance attached by us to this matter, Hägglöf should remember recent attack on Brunsbuttel Locks and recent mining of Kiel Canal. Each of these had been difficult operations requiring long preparation and special training and equipment.
What Foot said was obviously taken most seriously by Hägglöf; however, latter asked whether Allies were correct in placing such great importance on Baltic shipping. It would be necessary for Germans to employ German vessels for supplying or evacuating troops in Finland or Baltic States. It is unlikely that they would desist from doing so, so as to make up loss of Swedish vessels engaged in traffic in iron ore. That this is probably true was admitted by Foot. But he said in addition that highest importance was attached by us to reduction in general tonnage pool available in Baltic and northern waters generally to Germans. They would be greatly embarrassed if it was necessary for them to choose between ceasing to evacuate or provision their forces or abandoning their overseas trade. It was Foot’s desire to leave Hägglöf in no doubt regarding fact of our interest in this matter. Gradual attrition of enemy shipping in past had been part of our general program of economic warfare, which was designed to reduce enemy’s war potential gradually. However at this time question of amount of shipping available to enemy has an operational significance which is immediate.
Hägglöf informed us during this portion of conversation that recently there had been a decrease in number of German vessels [Page 604] trading with Sweden, but number of Danish vessels engaged in this trade on account of Germany increased. There was also a decrease in number of ships of Finnish registry because several of them had sought a refuge in ports in Sweden. Hägglöf had heard that total of these vessels was 35,000 tons (presumably dead weight).
Hägglöf was pressed by us to give us some idea of period which would elapse before all ports in Germany were closed to Swedish vessels. He was unable to do this, but our impression is that an answer on this might be given at a later interview by him. It was his promise that we would be informed currently as the ban was extended to each port. So far he stated Stettin was safest of all ports. To date the ban had not yet been applied to Stettin, (note: This is in conflict with the information Johnson was given by Boheman, but it is probable that version on [of] Hägglöf is correct).
According to Hägglöf at this time very few Swedish ships are calling at ports in Denmark; however, aside from ordinary shipping there are the Swedish-Danish and Swedish-German ferries. Although bulk of ferry traffic is small, value is high.
Hägglöf then stated that a number of those persons with whom these matters had been discussed by him in Stockholm were surprised that the Western Powers should have been the chief source for these approaches. These persons believed that it was likely that Russia would be the dominant power in Baltic, and it was their expectation that representations on such matters as the trade of Sweden with ports in Germany would come from Moscow, in first place. To this Foot replied that Russians agreed with us entirely. In addition particular interest had always been showing [shown] by them regarding traffic in iron ore. Naturally, however, each belligerent was inclined to have the largest interest in those particular operations in which it engaged its own forces. Attacks on enemy shipping in northern waters during last 4 years had mainly been carried out by Royal Navy, Coastal Command and Bomber Command, and this made British rather shipping conscious.
Hägglöf next raised question whether we still had an interest in discussing a war trade agreement for next year. Foot and Riefler expressed their opinion that this question was probably academic. Hägglöf agreed with them. Then Hägglöf proceeded to raise question of supplies. Sweden at present under War Trade Agreement has her basic rations. Then he asked when the war came to an end what would happen? Foot and Riefler replied that no answer to this question could be given by them. There would undoubtedly be acute shortages in period after armistice. Allocations of any supplies to neutral countries might even have to be at expense of countries which had been liberated. Should Government of Sweden be ready to stop [Page 605] all trade with Germany for remainder of war a strong case to Combined Board could have been made by us; however Foot and Riefler gathered that Swedish Government was unwilling to make a decision of this order. [Riefler.]