711.52/358: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 23—4:59 a.m.]
601. I told Jordana today I had communicated to my Government an account of our last conversations. The basic reaction in Washington has been one of disappointment that the Spanish Government seems willfully to misunderstand our motives and intentions. We believe we have made clear that we intend to respect Spanish neutrality and sovereignty, that we wish only friendly relations with Spain, the Spanish people, and the Spanish Government, and that we want cooperation with Spain and not hostility or unfriendliness. My Government especially regrets the allegation that we are now “threatening” or “coercing” Spain. There is no thought whatsoever on the American side of “threats” or “coercion”. What is in our minds quite simply is a strong conviction that we cannot justify making sacrifices to support Spanish economy in the absence of willingness on the part of the Spanish Government or [to] reciprocate our cooperative attitude; namely by taking the step entirely compatible with Spanish neutrality of declaring a permanent embargo on exportation of wolfram to all countries. Moreover my Government had asked me to repeat with emphasis what I had said to the Minister last Tuesday69 —that responsibility for the present unfortunate situation does not rest with the United States. On the contrary it was the Spanish Government’s unwillingness to respond to our patient and reasonable requests made over 3 months ago which obliged the United States acting strictly within its rights to reconsider its long standing support of Spanish economy and suspend petroleum shipments.
I said there was another point in his remarks of last Tuesday to which my Government has taken exception. He had implied that Spain had done the United Nations a great service by not cooperating in an Axis attack on US at Gibraltar [and] in North Africa. We fully recognized that the Spanish Government in 1940–1942 was professedly more pro-Axis than pro-Allied and that it did not even [Page 347] pretend to be really neutral. But we recognized, as we supposed lie did, that by keeping out of the conflict and by not cooperating with the Axis in attacks on Gibraltar and French Africa, Spain was serving her own best interests. Spain now has an opportunity to serve those interests again by granting our request for a wolfram embargo which in no respect would violate Spanish neutrality or impair Spanish sovereignty. I wished to make that point very clear.
Once the Spanish Government has agreed to a wolfram embargo, I said, there would be no great difficulty in Washington about issuing a statement as the Minister had proposed on February 3,70 and there would be no difficulty about issuing the statement prior to any publicity concerning the agreement about the wolfram embargo.
The Foreign Minister observed that he was very sorry to hear what I had just said and to appreciate that there is no way of going on with our negotiations in view of the attitude of the American Government. He would not repeat all the arguments he had used hitherto. That seemed useless. He would, however, suggest that there was one and only one way out of the impasse between our Governments. He recognized that the impasse was brought about by the wolfram question and not by the other matters which had already been pretty well cleared up in conversations between him and myself and between him and the British Ambassador. The one possible way out of the wolfram trouble was to arrive at a quick arrangement: namely, for the American Government to accept a limitation of Spanish exports to Germany at a figure to be negotiated, possibly at 10 percent of the total 1943 exports. Such a concession to us by Spain would involve Spain in a vast deal of trouble with the Germans, to say nothing of the other pending questions on which Spain was prepared to make concessions to us but which the Germans would regard as indicating hostility to them. The longer the crisis lasts, the worse it will become, and the Minister hoped that his proposal could be quickly accepted and acted upon.
I said that we, too, wanted an early conclusion of the difficulties. There was an obvious difference between our request for a complete permanent wolfram embargo and the other requests we had made in the last 3 or 4 months. The grant of the latter did not involve any concessions by Spain to the United Nations; it was simply carrying into effect the formal declaration of Spanish neutrality. Certainly Spain was obligated as a neutral to put an end to acts of sabotage and espionage against us on Spanish soil, to withdraw all Spanish troops from combat against us or our Allies, and to release the Italian ships. On the contrary, the granting of a wolfram embargo was not required by Spanish neutrality, although it was not at all in conflict with Spanish [Page 348] neutrality. It would be a concession to the United States, but a concession closely related to the concession which we had been making in supplying Spain with petroleum products. It was the one real concession we were asking for, and of basic importance. I said I would report his proposal about the limitation of exports to my Government, but I was sure it would not be acceptable. My Government asked for a complete and permanent embargo, and only for that. I expressed agreement with him that there was no use of repeating the arguments pro and con in the matter. All had been fully submitted and discussed in our previous conversations.
The Foreign Minister said that he would like to state, only as an explanation and not as an argument, that espionage and sabotage prosecution in Spain was a neutral duty for this country if the prosecution was directed impartially against both sides, but the American Government should appreciate that, despite this being Spain’s neutral duty, the carrying of it into full effect would create a vast amount of resentment, and probably many reprisals, on the part of the Germans. Regarding the other matters in question between us, exclusive of wolfram, he would admit they were all within the general province of Spain’s duty as a neutral, though they fell into varying classifications, and about some of them there was some question about such neutral duty. Apparently we wanted an interpretation of neutrality in Spain as benevolent neutrality towards us.
He would go along with us in this respect just as far as he possibly could.
About wolfram, the Minister recognized that Spain had the right as a neutral to accept or deny the embargo, but already Spain had an agreement with the Germans to supply them with a certain amount of wolfram, and if Spain should accept our demand for an embargo it would have to break its agreement with the Germans. Nevertheless, if the fundamental question could be resolved through negotiations drastically limiting the amount of exports to Germany, and if the Allies would agree to take the remainder of Spain’s wolfram production on reasonable prices, he felt the existing agreement with the Germans could be modified accordingly. He would like to be a little more specific on this proposal. What the Spanish Government proposed was to agree with Great Britain and the United States on a limitation to, say, 10 percent of wolfram exports to Germany, the Allies agreeing to take the rest at every [very?] reasonable prices to be fixed by negotiations. These negotiations would be essentially commercial and would be carried on by the Foreign Office with only expert aid from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
I asked Minister if he deemed it proper and convenient, to inform me about actual existing agreement with Germans.
[Page 349]Minister replied that he had no reluctance to telling me about it. There was an agreement between Spain and Germany. It did not provide for fixed amount wolfram for export to Germany but amount was linked with general German-Spanish clearing whereby Spain furnished Germany wolfram and a few other commodities in exchange for receipt from Germany of machinery, armaments and certain other commodities. During 1943, 23% of Spain’s wolfram exports had gone to Germany and it could be much smaller for 1944. The agreement was periodically renewed and if Spain could get from United: Nations certain necessary commodities which it was now getting from Germany there would be no reason why Spain could not very drastically reduce its exports to Germany. On other hand we should bear in mind that wolfram industry is very important to Spain not just for few individuals and corporations but for very large number of Spanish people who work in wolfram mines and in transportation. Consequently Spain would like some guarantee from [us that?] we would continue at least for a time a [at] really reasonable prices to buy wolfram so that industry would not be immediately and utterly ruined.
I told Minister that as I had pointed out to him in original memorandum of November 18,70a and as I had very recently been reinformed by my Government we were prepared to give sympathetic consideration to possibility of supplying materials now obtained by Spain from Germany once wolfram embargo is established. I repeated again that I was sure my Government would be satisfied only with full embargo not with mere limitation of exports to Germany.
To this Minister made no reply. I then said I hoped while he was consulting his Government further and I mine we could both avoid any unfortunate developments in realm of public recriminations. To elate I said my Government had managed to hold in check various American propaganda agencies on American radio and these had not engaged in any attacks upon Spain or Spanish Government. However, I and my Government were seriously disturbed by publicity line now being followed in Spain at obvious dictation of Government here. On one hand Spanish censorship is not permitting Spanish press or radio to give real reasons for suspension of petroleum shipments as set forth officially by American Secretary of State. On other hand Government here is inspiring and directing fabrication for home consumption trying by means of press editorials to persuade Spanish people that United Nations are threatening Spain’s neutrality and sovereignty. Moreover Spanish line is being implemented by great outbursts of German propaganda and rumor campaigns. If Spanish press and radio continue to pursue this hostile line toward us misrepresenting [Page 350] a clear case then American radio and propaganda cannot be expected to continue to refrain from replying and explaining real situation to Spanish people. We resent misrepresentations of real situation. This can only make situation vastly worse.
Minister replied that Spanish Government preferred precisely those tactics in press radio and propaganda which would keep from knowledge of Spanish people general course and specific details of actual negotiations on assumption negotiations would be freer and more quickly and satisfactorily concluded thereby. The unfortunate publicity he said had been begun by Allies and was now producing, pitiless and unjust campaigns against Spain and Spanish Government. It was this very publicity which had made our negotiations so extremely difficult. The Spanish Government did not publish the statement of American Secretary of State on petroleum matter because it believed such publication would irritate Spanish public opinion. As for editorials which have been appearing recently in Spanish newspapers Government regards them as kind of safety valve for exasperated public opinion.
I said that my Government has certainly not conducted or thought of conducting any pitiless or unjust campaign against Spain or Spanish Government. Quite the contrary. We had been extremely patient and our press and radio have shown very remarkable restraint and indulgence. I could see no justification whatsoever for authorizing publication of editorials in Spanish newspapers which completely misrepresented our attitude and at least implied United States was making demands on Spain in violation of Spanish neutrality and sovereignty. He must know such charges and implications were entirely baseless.
Minister said he did not think it mattered very much what appeared in Spanish newspapers. No Spaniard took them very seriously. The editorials in question were perhaps a bit misleading and if so he would try to remedy them. I must be fully aware that mass of Spanish people knew what real difficulties were between Spain and United States and were thoroughly skeptical of silly and preposterous rumors that Germans tried to spread.
He thanked me for my friendly and cordial spirit and asked me to communicate anew with my Government and see if it would not be disposed to accept this way out of existing impasse. It was only way he knew and only one he felt would be accepted by Spanish Government. I told him I would inform my Government but must warn him again that my Government had itself proposed way out which was acceptable to it and which I still believed should be acceptable to Spain in Spain’s own interest.