711.52/357: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 19—3:10 a.m.]
573. Hoare has just informed me of a lengthy conversation he had yesterday with Jordana. After making clear that Great Britain fully supported our request for a complete permanent embargo on wolfram exports, Hoare reviewed other matters at issue between Spain and the Allies and elicited from Jordana the following itemized statement:
- (1)
- Spain is willing to accept the British proposal concerning Italian merchant vessels namely that all except two will be released as soon as they are ready to sail and that the two will be held by Spain for its use under charter pending decision as to their ownership through subsequent negotiations or arbitration. Further Spain proposes to submit question of Italian warships to arbitration, a proposal which in the British Ambassador’s opinion is hardly satisfactory but which by reason of the fact that the Admiralty places little value on the warships he believes the British Government would be disposed to accept.
- (2)
- The Spanish Ambassador to Germany has just returned to Berlin with positive instructions to direct the prompt dissolution and repatriation of all the remaining units of the Blue Division and Blue Squadron. No Spanish Legion nor any other Spanish armed force would be allowed to serve in the war and no individual Spaniard enlisting in the German Army will receive any pay or aid of any sort from Spain.
- (3)
- Spain is ready now to suppress German Consulate in Tangier and to expel its staff including all members of German Military Mission in Morocco. Moreover, Spanish Government “mean business” about taking the most stringent measures to prevent acts of sabotage and espionage against us throughout Spain and to punish their perpetrators.
- (4)
- Spain cannot and will not consent to an absolute permanent embargo on wolfram exports. This would violate Spanish sovereignty and Franco and the Spanish Cabinet will positively not accept it regardless of sanctions or other serious consequences. If on this matter, however, the Allies would be conciliatory and would promptly resume petroleum shipments Spain would agree to limiting wolfram exports “to an insignificant amount of no real military value to [Page 342] Germany”. Without such an arrangement Spain cannot proceed to give full effect to the three items enumerated above.
Hoare believes that we have in the foregoing a basis for satisfactory agreement with Spain.
The first three items, with the possible exception of the proposal about the warships, represent in fact notable victories for United States and the fourth indicates a success in substance if not completely so in form.
Since the Department has made abundantly clear its position on wolfram I am making no new recommendations but, assuming the Department is interested principally in depriving Germany of wolfram rather than in broader objectives unknown to me, I submit the following observations.
The German Ambassador will doubtless return soon from Berlin bringing offers to Spain which may sound attractive even though Germany’s ability to carry them out completely may be questioned.
According to Smith’s calculations Spain’s present petroleum reserves can be stretched to last from 4 to 6 months if existing drastic restrictions can be maintained. If the present impasse continues, the temporary embargo on wolfram exports may be lifted and our principal objectives may be defeated whether or not we succeed later in obtaining a complete embargo. The Germans now have pending applications for 225 tons. If we persist in our present policy we can be certain of harming Spain but we are not certain of harming Germany and an ultimate victory over Spain might be devoid of practical wartime benefits.
Three hundred tons of wolfram were made available to Germany early last month. In the light of Jordana’s remarks to Hoare and to me and what the Portuguese Ambassador told me yesterday, there is a good possibility that we could obtain a continuing temporary embargo for the present 6 months and plus the promise of a drastic limitation of exports for the rest of the year. We would then effectively deprive the Germans of wolfram until the end of June and meanwhile military events may reduce the limited quantities to be made available to the Germans at a later date.
The willing cooperation of the Spanish Government in any plan designed to prevent wolfram from reaching [Ger]many is essential if smuggling is to be prevented or held to a minimum. A complete embargo is not a guarantee that smuggling will not take place. Moreover, the risks would be multiplied if Spanish Government gave an unwilling consent to such an embargo bearing in mind that German-owned mines have to fight to continue operating and that wolfram is also produced by tin mines. From the viewpoint of [Page 343] practical results we would probably gain more from a willing drastic limitation than from an unwilling complete embargo.
A prompt solution of our pending problems in Spain would appear to be in our interest.