860H.01/9–2344: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State
[Received September 23—3:48 p.m.]
510. See my 463, September 21, 10 a.m.60 Brigadier Maclean who has been in Mihailovich territory and who returned yesterday to AFHQ for consultation with regard to plans of Marshal Tito said last evening that he believed Tito had gone to a conference with Soviet generals in Rumania.61 He said that several days ago head of Soviet [Page 1411] Mission in Yugoslavia had told him a conference of Soviet military authorities including General Korneev was shortly to be held in Bucharest to discuss “the future of the Balkans”. Maclean stated he was not unduly alarmed over suddenness and manner of Tito’s departure [from] Vis. He added that it was perfectly natural for Tito to want to meet Russians to discuss military matters and that undoubtedly some word would come from Tito in 3 or 4 days.
Maclean went on to say that he thought Tito would endeavor to persuade Russians not to enter Yugoslavia; that he would attempt to convince Soviets that Partisans with some Russian heavy equipment could complete liberation of the country. He added that in his opinion if the Russians should insist on participating in liberation of Yugoslavia, Tito would urge them not to do so until after the Partisans had captured Belgrade. Maclean commented that if Russians were as shrewd as he thought they would be, they would follow Tito’s counsel.
Maclean then went on to outline what he thought Tito’s future policy would be. He asserted that recent events in Yugoslavia now assured Tito’s complete domination and he would exercise his power to the full. He would make it more and more difficult for Subasic and his government and Subasic would have to subscribe to Tito’s tactics. Nevertheless Maclean said he felt it was in “our” interests to support Subasic as much as possible to show Tito we meant to install Subasic government in Yugoslavia at least for time being.
Maclean went on to describe recent mass enlistments of Tito’s forces and stated that Mihailovich was a “finished man”.
Brigadier Maclean asserted that he had recommended to General Wilson and latter in turn would recommend to Churchill that British policy towards Tito should remain as at present, i.e., policy of giving assistance and friendly advice and encouraging as much as possible Tito’s ambition to be a chief of a strong and powerful democratic state rather than a puppet of Soviet Union or any other power. Maclean also said that shortly before he left Tito’s headquarters to go to Serbia on his recent trip, latter during course of a convivial evening had described at some length his views on future of Yugoslavia and Balkans. According to Maclean, Tito said that while he had hoped and indeed still hoped that some sort of an association of federated states could be established as government of Yugoslavia, he feared more and more that it would not be practicable—at least not immediately after liberation—and it would probably be necessary for first few years to rule Yugoslavia with an iron hand to “cleanse” country of those undesirable elements which would go underground after triumph of Partisan cause.
- Not printed.↩
- Marshal Tito had actually left Vis on September 22 and gone secretly to Moscow. In telegram 3730, September 30, 1944, the Ambassador in Moscow reported that on September 29 an agreement was reached between the Soviet command and the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation permitting passage of Soviet troops through Yugoslav territory for the purpose of developing operations against the enemy (740.0011EW/9–3044). According to telegram 8635, October 12, 1944, from London, Sir Orme Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State, characterized Tito’s sudden departure as “inexcusable”, but he felt that Moscow’s attempt to conceal the trip was even worse (860H.01/10–1244).↩