860H.01/7–344: Telegram
The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 4—3:40 a.m.]
2284. The following has been received this evening from Merrill16 at Bari:
“The policy committee today considered and revised draft of an overall directive to the forces under the control of the Balkan Air Force.17 The section which concerns United States and regarding which our concurrence as a member of the committee is requested is now as follows:
‘The general policy is that all possible military support should be accorded to those elements willing and able to resist the enemy. The final goal is to further the cause of national unity throughout the country in preparation for post-war settlements. No action should be initiated which would commit us to a recognition of any claims to the revision of pre-war frontiers. Such questions must be held in abeyance for settlement at the peace conference. This means in Yugoslavia that we should provide the fullest aid to Tito’s Partisans. We should encourage the union of all the fighting units in Yugoslavia with the National Army of Liberation in a single front in accord with the provisions of the Tito–Subasich agreement. No support will be furnished the Mihailovich forces. Support will not be furnished the Partisans where it is obvious that they will use it not against the Germans, Bulgarians, Ustashi18 and other definitely accepted Quislings, but merely against the Chetniks, Support may be given, however, in cases where Partisan forces are fighting Chetniks who are definitely collaborating with the Germans, Bulgarians or Quisling Serbian units and in cases where the Partisans find active opposition in attacks on mines, lines of comunication or other objectives of a military value. We would use as our guiding principle, except for the two exceptions already noted, the idea that we must not become involved in or a party to purely internal conflicts or domestic issues in Yugoslavia.
As far as Albania is concerned, we should furnish the LNC military support, for it is the only element resisting the enemy on an active basis. We should do all we can to bring about a working agreement between the LNC and any elements such as the Nationalists in northern Albania which may be willing to cooperate. Hungary: The prime objective is to get Hungary out of the [Page 1384] war as soon as it can be accomplished.19 Any group which may emerge ready to resist the enemy would receive our support’.
Although Norden and I feel that certain portions of foregoing may be at odds with our policy as we last knew it (especially the expressed support of the Subasich–Tito agreement) we feel we should not object since the directive is to be applied only to present military operations and is subject to modification. What is your advice in this matter? Do we have your approval to agree to the directive when presented in final form to the committee on July 5th?”
I propose advising Merrill that we would object to the blanket statement “no support will be furnished the Mihailovitch forces”. The statement as it stands is inconsistent with our stated policy to aid whatever forces may be fighting the Germans. It seems to me that if Mihailovitch forces are actively engaged in combatting Germans they would merit our assistance.
I should appreciate Department’s comments.
- Frederick T. Merrill, Foreign Service Officer in the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.↩
- The Balkan Air Force with headquarters at Bari had the mission of coordinating and supporting Allied military operations in the Balkans. The meeting of the policy committee referred to was held at Bari on June 28, 1944.↩
- The Croatian National Liberation Movement.↩
- For United States interest in attempts to remove Hungary from the war, see vol. iii, pp. 847 ff.↩