Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/34389: Telegram

The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

Algiers, May 27, 1944—5 p.m.
[Received 9:40 p.m.]

1745. From Murphy. In response to a request to PWE⁹⁶ and OWI⁹⁷ in London for joint guidance on Yugoslavia, PWB of AFHQ⁹⁸ has received a message from PWE calling attention to Churchill’s May 24 speech.¹ The message notes particularly his definition of the objective as being to make all forces in Yugoslavia work together “under Tito’s military direction” for an independent and united Yugoslavia to drive the Germans out.

Since my understanding is that it is not the American objective to unite all Yugoslav forces under Tito, I am advising PWB tentatively that we cannot approve such a line. An urgent expression of the Department’s views would be appreciated.

This particular case is an example of numerous problems that can be expected to come up more frequently in the future. I have noted the OWI views on integration of the Balkan Section of OWI at Cairo into PWB (Department’s 1595, May 22, 5 p.m.²) particularly the points that it is not desirable for the United States to become identified with British policy in this area and that if the British want to take a strong propaganda line supporting a certain leader or ruler their statements, broadcasts or leaflets should bear a clear British label and could not bear an Allied label.

This seems to raise the fundamental question of whether OWI can continue to participate in PWB, which like other parts of AFHQ is such a closely integrated Anglo-American organization that it is operationally impossible for it to handle divergent propaganda lines. Any attempt to put a British label on a certain propaganda line and American label on another would destroy the fundamental principle of unity of action. Since it has long been the practice for leaflets dropped over occupied territory to call on the people to do various things in the name of “United Nations” or “The Allies”, the putting of a clear British label on certain leaflets would make the divergence of policy immediately apparent and add ammunition to the enemy “split-the-Allies” line. Similar considerations apply to radio, PWB radio broadcasts being identified as “United Nations Radio”.

While the policy toward Yugoslavia is the immediate issue, similar problems with regard to French, Greek and other affairs in this area should be anticipated.

I have consulted with Russell Barnes³ and other OWI officials here and they feel that it is essential for the continued joint operation of PWB that they receive authoritative joint guidance on all propaganda matters. They suggest that London probably is the center at which the propaganda line can best be coordinated. In the past joint PWB–OWI directives have been received from London, indicating that machinery exists there for “marrying” Anglo-American propaganda lines. It is just such cases as the Yugoslavia guidance cited above, however, in which such coordination is essential if joint operation here is to continue.

PWB will attempt to avoid the issue regarding Tito as long as possible, but emphasize the urgent need of a propaganda theme acceptable to both British and American Governments.⁴

Sent to the Department as 1745; repeated to London as 181; repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh. [Murphy.]

Chapin

96. Psychological Warfare Executive, the British counterpart of the American Office of War Information.
97. Office of War Information.
98. Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters.
1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, col. 775.
2. Not printed.
3. Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters.
4. In telegram 1834, June 10, 1944, 8 p.m., to Algiers, which was in answer to this telegram and to telegram 1915, June 9, 1944, 8 p.m., from Algiers (not printed) the Acting Secretary of State declared: “The Department is not now prepared to accept, as an Allied objective, the urging of all forces in Yugoslavia to work under Tito’s military leadership, particularly since the British themselves have apparently reached no final decision in this respect as indicated by your 1850 of June 6, 5 p.m. [not printed]. Furthermore, the Department is of the opinion that the proposed objective would be premature in view of current negotiations for the formation of a representative Yugoslav cabinet. Finally, information available to the Department does not indicate that the proposed objective has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.” (740.0011 European War 1939/34389)