740.41112A/12–2744: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
57. Reurtel 9377, October 30, and reurdes 18908, October 30.10 After giving careful consideration to arguments advanced by Black [Page 205] List Committee Department is not prepared to adopt policy of no further additions to Confidential List. Department highly desirous of formulating joint policy regarding more restricted inclusion in secret lists and greater liberality in deletion, in order to avoid unfortunate effects of uncoordinated action in matters of economic controls.
Department’s fundamental view is that published and secret lists should continue complementary weapons of economic warfare as long as blockade and export controls continue. It is difficult to see how published lists alone can be administered to attain objectives which formerly required use of both types. It is obvious that freezing a secret list kills it insofar as new control situations are concerned. More concretely, freezing of Black List raises these problems:
- 1.
- Rationalization of this freezing policy with policy previously agreed upon regarding limiting additions to published lists and reduction of their present size. Compare Lisbon’s Blocked National Report no. 1025, November 22.11 Regarding deletions from published lists, has MEW considered and discounted possibility of using secret lists to prevent unfair advantage from accruing to some whom it may be considered desirable to remove from the published lists under the reduction program without requiring undertakings?
- 2.
- Has MEW considered the possible adverse impressions that might arise from observable inequality of treatment as between one already blacklisted and another in pari delicto? Should it ever become necessary to wage economic warfare again, a reputation for rewarding friends at the expense of those who aided the enemy will be most advantageous and a contrary recollection most impeding.
- 3.
- Does unilateral freezing of Black List indicate that unilateral reduction is apt to follow? If so, the British must foresee the adverse criticism that would arise against them in the American export community, unless, of course, this Government should begin to compete in the abolition of controls to the damage of present and postwar economic security.
It is believed that long range interests of both countries would be served by attaining substantial identity of both secret lists and maintaining them as living controls as long as blockade continues. Department therefore proposes that MEW consider reopening the Black List to narrow categories of new cases and collaborate with American authorities in formulating joint criteria for reduction in size of secret lists and for subsequent inclusions. You may indicate to MEW that Department is now reviewing Confidential List for Western Hemisphere for purpose of very substantially reducing its size. Tentatively it is thought that cloaking should be principal ground for continued inclusion in Confidential List and this only where there is reasonable probability of cloaking or attempted cloaking within past 2 years.
[Page 206]Please take up foregoing with British in informal and friendly manner and report results. Peterson13 has discussed these and related matters in Department and on return may be instructed to assume firmer position should present instruction not produce satisfactory results.