840.48 Refugees/7–1244: Telegram
The Consul at Algiers (Lawton) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13—10:02 a.m.]
2366. From Murphy for WRB. Your 2011, June 26, 7 p.m. My 1937, June 10 was prepared and sent after full consultation with Allied military authorities at AFHQ who are in final analysis best qualified judges as to how much can be done in connection with general subject of refugees consistent with military duties.
From second paragraph of your telegram under reference, it seems evident that the WRB is not aware that Allies do not have a single port on Yugoslav mainland and that practically everything that is going into that country now is by air and priorities are fixed in accordance with close coordination between Marshal Tito and military officials at AFHQ.
As reported in Algiers’ 2217, June 30, midnight,14 the military directive referred to in fifth paragraph of your message was removed by Supreme Allied Commander on June 14. The memorandum referred to in your telegram was based on staff study prepared at AFHQ. The substance of the staff study was that these instructions had been issued at a time when the shortage of medical personnel in mid-East had become acute and facilities for receiving additional [Page 1093] Partisan refugees both in Italy and mid-East were on point of exhaustion. The communication as of that date shows that 21,489 out of a total of 25,000 persons agreed for acceptance had already been evacuated to mid-East. 8638 persons were being held in Italy where new arrivals were averaging 1722 per week. An added consideration at that time was the presence at AFHQ of a mission of Marshal Tito’s which on the one hand was endeavoring to obtain a commitment for the acceptance of additional Partisan refugees at a rate of from 4 to 5 thousand a month while on the other there were complaints that facilities and arrangements provided in mid-East were inadequate and that the refugees already in Egypt should best be moved to a suitable climate. In these circumstances further complicated by fact that AFHQ was quite understandably according first priority with respect to both transportation and accommodation facilities to Partisan wounded, it seemed advisable temporarily to discourage an increase in rate of evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia pending a solution of the problem. At same time immediate negotiations were initiated with mid-East with a view to raising quota for acceptance in that area and a general investigation was instituted of possibility of developing reception facilities in other areas elsewhere in North Africa. The latter part of May mid-East agreed to raise its quota to 40,000 on condition that UNRRA would provide the necessary medical personnel MERRA–UNRRA had previously applied for.
With regard to statement in paragraph 5 of your message under reference, that flow of refugees decreased substantially during month of May, I am authorized by AFHQ to inform the WRB for its secret information that an extensive German campaign against Partisan forces of Marshal Tito was largely responsible for this delay and even Partisan officials have admitted this fact. There may have been some slowdown due to this order but there is little doubt in minds of highest military officials that military events were the large factor in connection with drop in evacuation of refugees for month of May 1944. There are now no restrictive measures outstanding aimed at discouraging flow of refugees from Yugoslavia.
With regard to your inquiry as to finding havens of refuge in Mediterranean area, everything possible is being done for increased accommodations and facilities in Italy. Mr. Ackermann who has been in Italy for almost a month has been canvassing the situation.
As I reported in an earlier message today, French authorities have given their agreement in principle to establishment of a refugee camp at Philippeville (see my 1937, June 10).
I should like to invite attention of WRB to fact that the various officials of AFHQ have always been most sympathetic and understanding [Page 1094] in connection with refugee question and are doing everything possible under very difficult conditions to alleviate refugee situation in Balkans and Italy. They are disappointed, however, that UNRRA has not yet been able to operate on a substantial scale. A further complication from military point of view is fact that considerable pressure has been brought to bear on the SAC in connection with evacuation of large numbers of military wounded from Yugoslavia. [Murphy.]
- Not printed.↩