740.0011 E.W./12–2844

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

His Majesty’s Ambassador is instructed to inform the United States Government of an approach made to a member of His Majesty’s Legation at Stockholm by Dahlerus48 regarding Germany, details of which are set out in the enclosed paraphrases of two telegrams from His Majesty’s Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office dated December 15th and December 20th. The first of these telegrams was sent by bag to London and not by telegram.

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2.
In reply, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has expressed his regret that any conversation was held with Dahlerus with reference to his journey to Germany. It was to be expected that German military support of the attack in the West would be accompanied by a deliberate attempt to sow suspicion and dissension amongst the Allies with the object of bringing about a compromise peace with one or other of them. Mr. Eden went on to say that he strongly suspected that the information given by Stegmann,49 as also the information in paragraph 4 of the longer of the two telegrams enclosed,50 may have been planted by the Germans with this purpose. Mr. Eden gave instructions that no member of the staff of His Majesty’s Legation at Stockholm was in future to enter into any discussion of this nature with Dahlerus or with anyone else. It was to be expected that a number of peace feelers would be launched and the utmost vigilance was necessary to ensure that no encouragement was being made to any.
3.
His Majesty’s Ambassador at Moscow51 has been instructed to convey the above information to the Soviet Government.
[Enclosure 1]

Paraphrase of telegram from His Majesty’s Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office dated December 15th, 1944

Dahlerus visited Counsellor52 on December 13 to say he had just met a German friend of his by the name of Stegmann who was on a visit to Sweden. Stegmann was married to the daughter of the former Swiss Minister at Berlin and his family was now living in Switzerland. He was solicitor of a certain Kloth who was part owner of [2 groups undecipherable] Werke manufacturers of stoves and restaurant equipment at Hildesheim. Dahlerus had known both Kloth and Stegmann previously and the former had been aware of his attempts at mediation just before the outbreak of the war. Dahlerus was convinced neither Kloth nor Stegmann had any sympathies for National Socialism and that they were both men whose word could be relied on.

According to Stegmann, Hitler had had a bad shock at the time of the attempt on his life and had had to have an operation on one of his ears. Since then he had no capacity for work and he lost interest in any subject after discussing it for ten minutes or so. Otherwise he appeared perfectly normal and was able to go about and attend superficially to business and he was in fact in Berlin on December 11. There was no question of his life being in danger as a result [Page 576] of the effects of the accident but he was definitely out of the running for the purposes of practical leadership.

Himmler who was now virtual dictator of Germany had achieved this position by reaching an agreement with the military with whom he was now on very close and friendly terms. All the leading military were anti-Nazi in the sense that they were opposed to party dictatorship and Himmler had gained their support by gradually abolishing all Nazi plans and ideals. In opposition to Himmler stood Ribbentrop, Ley53 and the other extremists of the Left but it was probable Goebbels had joined the Hitler [Himmler?] Camp. Goering was opposed to Himmler but he was now of no importance whatever except insofar as he was still popular with the people.

Himmler hoped to produce a German fighting force of five million military. With these he was confident he could hold the Russian front and he hoped to hold the western front long enough to cause enough losses of British and American troops to persuade the Western Powers to agree to a more reasonable settlement with Germany. Himmler had initiated no contacts with the Allies but Ribbentrop had done so and these contacts had been backed by Hitler and the old Nazi regime.

An indication of Himmler’s new policy was that during the last four weeks wives and families of all those who took part in the attempt on Hitler’s life including the family of Stauffenberg himself had been released and pensioned. It was not generally known that the clean up which followed July 20 also included the arrest and shooting of all those Germans who were attempting to reach a settlement with Russia. Himmler was a great opponent of Russia and was determined to exterminate all those with a contrary view on this question.

Dahlerus then said that he was turning over in his mind the idea of visiting Germany where he thought he could arrange possibly through his friends Stegmann and Kloth to be received by Himmler and he would take this opportunity to try to find out whether Himmler seriously thought there was any use in continuing the struggle and if not what steps he proposed to take with a view to suing for peace. Before deciding however whether to go to Germany Dahlerus asked for an assurance that if he reported result of his visit to us British Foreign Office would believe what he said. He added that he knew he had been in our black book and that there had been a move to blacklist him and he thought that as a result of this the Foreign Office might not believe a word he said; if this were the case there would be no point whatever in his carrying out his plan.

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Counsellor suggested in reply that it was in the circumstances hardly reasonable to expect the Foreign Office to commit themselves to a definite answer to this question. The Foreign Office he said had no intention of encouraging Dahlerus or anyone else to sound Himmler as to his intentions and if Dahlerus really intended to pursue his plan he must do so entirely on his own initiative and without any prompting from us or any assurances from us of any kind. All that Counsellor could say was that reports of his early conversations with Goering had been reported in detail to London where they had been read with interest.

Counsellor then said that he thought it was only fair to make it clear before Dahlerus decided to go to Berlin that whatever proposal Himmler might make there was no chance whatever of His Majesty’s Government agreeing to negotiate with him in any circumstances whatever and that therefore any interest which His Majesty’s Government might have in the result of Dahlerus’s initiative would be purely of an intelligence nature. Dahlerus said that while he fully appreciated this he thought it possible that Himmler might agree to retire altogether with the whole of the rest of the Nazi gang and leave it to other elements to sue for peace.

Dahlerus accordingly agreed to withdraw his request and he is now considering whether to proceed with his plan. He will let Counsellor know in a few days’ time.

[Enclosure 2]

Paraphrase of telegram from His Majesty’s Minister at Stockholm to the Foreign Office dated December 20th, 1944

Dahlerus told Counsellor today that he now believes that Stegmann came to Stockholm to contact him on behalf of Himmler. Dahlerus added that he told Stegmann that whereas he would personally be glad to intervene between the Germans and British he could not visualise any circumstances in which the British would be prepared to talk with Himmler. Stegmann is returning to Berlin presumably to report and Dahlerus has promised to inform Counsellor if he receives an invitation to visit Himmler.

Dahlerus says he was incorrect in reporting Stegmann as having said that Stauffenberg’s wife has been released. She is only conspirators’ wife still detained but she is expected to be released shortly.

  1. Birger Dahlerus, Swedish civil engineer and manufacturer.
  2. For information on Stegmann, see enclosure 1.
  3. Enclosure 1.
  4. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
  5. William H. Montagu-Pollock.
  6. Robert Ley, leader of the German Labor Front.