Office of the Historian

740.00119 E.W./9–1944: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson), to the Secretary of State

Caserta, September 19, 1944—midnight.
[Received September 20—9:37 p.m.]

459. My 324, September 7. Information has reached this office that Neubacher wishes to discuss total German surrender15 but points out difficulty of finding a competent group of liberals within Germany to discuss matter with Allies and to carry on administrative functions Allies would assign. He apparently wishes Allied troops to be ready for occupation immediately upon surrender. He claims Hungary is in danger of an internal explosion with anarchy threatening. Germans holding North Yugoslavia only to postpone this explosion which would start trouble within Germany. Consequently there is great interest in preventing anarchy in a region from where it might spread to Germany. A German effort will be made to hold Sava line from east to west and Hungarian lines formed by rivers running south to Danube. Germans are bringing troops from Greece by road at night through Nis and Smederevo. Gestapo evacuating all North Yugoslavia.

OSS informant reports Neubacher is apparently sincere in his desire for immediate unconditional surrender but no accurate information is available on size of group he represents. According to this source Germans would presumably allow Allied entry if non-Soviet troops held Trieste or Fiume to Belgrade line. Only impediment to total surrender is German fear Allies will allow a state of chaos to exist in Germany over a long period.

Kirk
  1. In a memorandum (not printed), of September 21, 1944, from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State, it was reported that the OSS representative, Lt. Col. McDowell, had been invited to Belgrade to discuss “total surrender” with Neubacher, who had just returned from Hitler’s headquarters. McDowell, however, had been instructed not to go to Belgrade nor to initiate any negotiations for peace. (740.00119 EW/9–2144)↩