845.00/1906
Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the President 30
Dear Mr. President: Gandhi has successfully completed his fast and the only result of it has been increasing bitterness against the British from large sections of the people. The Government has handled the case from the legalist point of view. Gandhi is the “enemy” and must not be allowed to escape from his just punishment and at all cost British prestige must be maintained.
Indians look at it from a different angle. Gandhi’s followers regard him as semi-divine and worship him. Millions who are not his followers look upon him as the foremost Indian of the day and that since he has never had an opportunity to defend himself it is a case of persecution of an old man who has suffered much for the cause which every Indian has at heart—freedom for India. And so presumably Gandhi comes out of the struggle with an enhanced reputation as a moral force.
The general situation as I see it today is as follows:
From the British viewpoint their position is not unreasonable. They have been in India for 150 years and except for the mutiny in 1857, generally speaking, internal peace has been maintained. They have acquired vast vested interests in the country and fear that their withdrawal from India would jeopardize those interests. The great cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras have been built up largely through their initiative. They have guaranteed the regime of the Princes, who control territorially about one-third of the country and one-fourth of the population. They realize that new forces are gathering throughout the world which affect their hold over India and they have therefore gone out of their way, so they believe, to offer freedom to India as soon as there are signs that the Indians themselves can form a secure government. This the Indian leaders have been unable to do and the British feel that they have done all that they can in the circumstances. Behind the door is Mr. Churchill, who gives the impression that personally he would prefer not to transfer any power to an Indian Government either before or after the war and that the status quo should be maintained.
The Indians, on the other hand, are caught in the new idea which is sweeping over the world, of freedom for oppressed peoples. The Atlantic Charter has given the movement great impetus. Your speeches have given encouragement. The British declarations that freedom would be granted to India after the war have brought the [Page 206] picture of Indian independence as never before in the thoughts of the entire Indian intelligentsia. Unfortunately, as the time approaches for ending the war, the struggle for political prestige and power between the parties has increased and this has made it more difficult than ever for the leaders to be willing to reach a compromise agreement. And furthermore, Gandhi and all Congress leaders, not to mention the fifty or sixty thousand Congress supporters, are in jail and as Congress is the strongest political party, there is no one available to speak for it.
There is thus a complete deadlock and I should imagine that the Viceroy and Churchill are well satisfied to let the deadlock remain as long as possible. That is, at least, the general impression in most Indian circles.
The problem, therefore, is, can anything be done to break this deadlock through our help? It seems to me that all we can do is to try to induce the Indian political leaders to meet together and discuss the form of government which they regard as applicable to India, and thus to show the world that they have sufficient intelligence to tackle the problem. We must not assume that they will adopt the American or British systems. In view of the importance of guaranteeing protection to the minorities, a majority form of government may not be applicable and a coalition may prove to be the only practical way of guaranteeing internal harmony. We cannot suppose that the British Government can or will transfer power to India by the scratch of a pen at the conclusion of the peace conference unless there is an Indian Government fit to receive it. The question remains, therefore, how to induce the leaders to begin now to prepare for their future responsibilities.
There is, perhaps, a way out of the deadlock which I suggest to you, not because I am sure of its success, but because I think it is worthy of your consideration.
With the approval and blessing of the British Government, an invitation could be addressed to the leaders of all Indian political groups on behalf of the President of the United States, to meet together to discuss plans for the future. The assembly could be presided over by an American who could exercise influence in harmonizing the endless divisions of caste, religion, race and political views. The conference might well be under the patronage of the King Emperor, the President of the United States, the President of the Soviet Union31 and Chiang Kai-shek,32 in order to bring pressure to bear on Indian politicians. Upon the issuance of the invitations, the King Emperor could give a fresh assurance of the intention of the British Government to transfer power to India upon a certain date as well [Page 207] as his desire to grant a provisional set-up for the duration. The conference could be held in any city in India except Delhi.
American chairmanship would have the advantage, not only of expressing the interest of America in the future independence of India, but would also be a guarantee to the Indians of the British offer of independence. This is an important point because, as I have already said in previous letters, British promises in this regard are no longer believed.
If either of the principal parties refused to attend the conference it would be notice to all the world that India was not ready for self-government, and I doubt whether a political leader would put himself in such a position. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery may be obstacles, for, nothwithstanding statements to the contrary, India is governed from London, down to the smallest details.
Should you approve the general idea and care to consult Churchill, he might reply that, since the Congress leaders are in jail, a meeting such as is contemplated is impossible. The answer could be that certain of the leaders, notably Gandhi, might be freed unconditionally in order to attend the conference. The British may even be searching for a good excuse to release Gandhi, for the struggle between him and the Viceroy is over with honors for both—the Viceroy has maintained his prestige; Gandhi has carried out his protest against the Government by his successful fast, and has come back into the limelight.
There is nothing new in my suggestion, except the method of approach to the problem. The British have already announced their willingness to grant freedom to India after the war, if the Indians have agreed among themselves as to its form. The Indians say they cannot agree because they have no confidence in the British promises. The proposed plan perhaps provides the guarantee required by the Indians, and is in line with British declared intentions.
Possibly this is a way out of the impasse, which if allowed to continue, may affect our conduct of the war in this part of the world and our future relations with colored races. It may not be successful, but, at least, America will have taken a step in furthering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.
I offer the suggestion now in order that it may have your consideration before my return to Washington at the end of April or early May, when I shall be able to give you at first hand further information on the subject.
Sincerely yours,