Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

851R.01/210: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

Algiers, February 18, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received 7:20 p.m.]

228. For the President and Secretary of State from Murphy. We believe that the following resume of the situation in North Africa should be brought to your attention. Macmillan is sending an identical telegram to the British Prime Minister as the basis of possible consultation with you.

1. The Tunisian campaign will take much longer to terminate than was anticipated when military operations began in North Africa and subsequently when the present political arrangements with the local authorities were concluded.

2. As a result of the Anfa Conference the immediate situation in North Africa improved owing (a) to the support which the Conference gave to General Giraud’s position and (a) to the promise which it held out to a political settlement between Giraud and de Gaulle.

3. Since the Conference there has been some further improvement in the local political atmosphere which has, however, not yet been translated into many positive administrative achievements. The progress towards a Giraud-de Gaulle understanding has been marked by hesitation on both sides and has been too slow to overcome the tendency towards divergence which will continue so long as effective and permanent contact is not established between the two groups. On the Allied side, although nearly a month has passed, there has been no realization of the promises held forth at Anfa in particular as regards military supplies, and in consequence there is growing disillusionment here. (The purely military aspect is the subject of a separate telegram.⁸⁵)

4. This disillusionment is giving rise to a belief both in the Administration and the Army here that the United Nations have no intention of supporting a French Army except as a defensive force; that the military effort here is being held back, as a matter of policy; and that as a result French troops will have no share in the conquest of France and France will not be present at the victory. This belief is having its effect on the morale of the French Army. The slow course of the Tunisian campaign contributes to this concern which in turn is holding up progress on the political side. The conclusion is that we are in a vicious circle. The failure to supply armaments is holding up political progress and the lack of progress may be having an adverse effect on the supply of armaments.

5. In the light of this situation we feel obliged to suggest that the policy of two Governments towards the French problem should be further defined. The prolongation of the Tunisian campaign and the potential deterioration of the general situation in North Africa in particular raise the question it is desirable to defer until a later stage of the war, a decision whether the various elements of the French Empire are to be regarded and treated as separate administrative units or whether it is not now indispensable to bring about their fusion in the interests both of the present campaign and of those in contemplation.

It is certain that if the position is not clarified the benefits of the Anfa Conference for the French situation will be dissipated.

6. The present moment is suitable for further definition of policy, since political changes can still be exacted in return for undertakings in regard to the supply and armaments and the future participation of the French Army in the war. It is clear that if we wish to improve the situation and indeed to prevent its further decline we must be prepared to give and execute definite commitments on these two points and also to contemplate the acceptance of a provisional French authority which will speak for all French territories and French men adhering to the movement of Giraud and de Gaulle.

7. If you agree to the foregoing we recommend that a new joint approach should be made to General Giraud and de Gaulle in the sense that the present French situation is unsatisfactory; that it is compromising the future role of the French Army, that it is having an adverse effect upon opinion in occupied Europe; and that the basis should be found without delay for an agreement between all Frenchmen and French territories outside France with such minimum changes of policy and personnel as may be necessary to bring this about.

8. Should you approve we should submit suggestions on procedure.

[Murphy]
Wiley

85. Telegram No. 252, February 20, midnight, p. 61.