Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

740.00119 European War 1939/2024

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

In the British Embassy’s memorandum of November 19th, reference was made to the proposal to publish the full terms of the Italian surrender together with the amending protocol.

2. His Majesty’s Government feel that as the situation is now developing it will become increasingly difficult to justify the continued non-publication of these documents. Now that the public are aware of the existence of the long terms of surrender, pressure in the United Kingdom in favour of publication will increase, and it will be difficult for His Majesty’s Government to find good reasons for resisting this.

3. Two arguments may be advanced against publication:

(a) that it would have a bad effect on the Italian people and lessen their desire to cooperate, and;

(b) that it would weaken the Badoglio Government and perhaps bring on a second Governmental crisis before the Allied forces reach Rome.

Neither of these arguments appear to His Majesty’s Government to be particularly strong on close examination.

4. As regards (a) it is apparent that most Italians are so apathetic about the war and about politics in general that they would be quite unmoved by the news that their Government had signed a second armistice on the lines foreshadowed in the first But even if there were any force in this argument it would apply equally or more strongly at a later date when the armistice finally came to be published, as at some stage it inevitably must be, and when the disadvantages which are feared would be just as serious or still more so.

5. The essence of argument (b) is that to publish the armistice would weaken the position of the Badoglio Government by publicly saddling it with the responsibility for what might be regarded as a humiliating document. His Majesty’s Government agree that within the limits permitted by the general apathy referred to in the preceding paragraph there is a possibility of this effect being produced, particularly if the publication took place before the Government had got into its stride. On the other hand the Badoglio Government will sooner or later be succeeded by a new Government. There is a risk that unless the new Government are informed about it and accept the armistice in advance they will later repudiate it, or alternatively if they accept the armistice, their followers, when the terms are eventually published, will oblige them to repudiate it or try to overthrow them. The best way to minimise a risk of this kind is to make the terms public well before the Badoglio Government is likely to be changed. The obligations and responsibilities of its successors will then be clear for all to see.

6. The amending protocol has now been signed. The Badoglio Government is now as firmly in the saddle as it can ever be expected to be. The long terms and the amending protocol have been communicated to the Allied Governments. His Majesty’s Government therefore feel that this is the appropriate moment for publication of the terms, and that continued failure to publish will expose them to considerable criticism.

7. Although His Majesty’s Government do not believe that the Soviet Government were a party to the original agreement to keep the long terms secret, as suggested in General Eisenhower’s telegram to the combined Chiefs of Staff, NAF 508 of November 6th, they would in any case propose before proceeding to publication to ask His Majesty’s Ambassador at Moscow to confirm that the Soviet Government have no objection.

8. His Majesty’s Government earnestly hope that the United States Government will agree to early publication. They would be grateful for a reply as soon as may be convenient.⁴⁶

Washington , November 23, 1943.

46. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, December 1, 1943, p. 398.