851T.01/70
The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa (Glassford) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)25
[Received November 30.]
Dear Dunn: Pursuant to our conversation when recently you passed through Dakar, in regard to clarification of my situation in French West Africa, I should like very much to record here as an aide-mémoire for you the substance of my views as then expressed and with which I felt you agreed in principle.
I should like to say to you first of all that it was my understanding when I left Washington in June that I was to regard the eventual building up of Dakar as one of the prime United Nations strategic strongholds as the objective of my mission. Further I understood that I should not discuss the matter or enter into negotiations with the French until further instructed. It was intimated to me in no uncertain terms that Dakar itself should be taken over eventually by the United Nations to be administered by the United States, as a delegate of the United Nations. The French were to move to St. Louis, about one hundred miles to the northward on the coast.
Lacking further instructions I must conclude of course that the desire that I take no action remains unaltered. At the same time it is quite possible, in my view, that progressive developments since last June, culminating in the recent crystalization of all authority in a civil Committee of Liberation have served to emphasize the fact in Washington that the French are determined to maintain their sovereignty throughout the Empire at all costs. At the present time the sovereignty of France can be exercised only in the Colonies, a fact which renders the French jealous and suspicious with respect to their overseas possessions and correspondingly complicates the position of a representative of the President in one of their colonies who, by force of circumstance must conceal the purpose of his mission.
In my judgment, based on experience gained in Africa, especially since the advent of the De Gaulle regime, the activities of which have confirmed in my view that the French will brook no outside interference [Page 193] in the administration of their colonies but will fight for their sovereignty over them if necessary, the time has come when full realization must be given to the desirability of inducing the French themselves to create out of Dakar the military stronghold envisaged by the United Nations, the latter assisting the French as our partner in this project, as may be convenient and necessary to the French.
If such could be our announced policy, then I could come out into the open with my French colleagues here in French West Africa in the well defined role of representing the President in implementing our share of the United Nations’ joint effort to help the French make of Dakar the military strategic point desired. Surveys could be made at once by the French with such assistance as we could give them and which I feel they would welcome especially with respect to more modern methods, installations and equipment. The military, naval and air establishments and defenses could be determined in accordance with actual United Nations and French requirements. Plans could be submitted at once and their implementation started as soon as Allied more important commitments elsewhere permitted.
This is to my mind briefly the logical procedure for us to pursue in our relations here with the French. I trust that these views will meet with approval and that I may be instructed in response to them with as little delay as possible.
Already I have expressed to the President the gradual lessening of American prestige here due in most part to our unsatisfactory economic relations and dealings with the French in A.O.F. up to about a month ago. These however have much improved since then. I know that my own unclarified overall situation is being discussed by the French authorities whose logical thinking I feel inclines them to regard this Mission with obvious suspicion. They are very intelligent and most astute. I feel very strongly that we must act at once to remedy this situation. The means to do so I firmly believe are set forth above.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,
- Telegram No. 50, February 12, 1944, 7 p.m., to the Consul General at Dakar conveyed the reply from Dunn to Glassford that the contents of this letter had been discussed with Barnes while the latter was in Washington; Barnes was to report to Glassford in detail on his return to Dakar (851T.01/70b).↩