Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Administrative Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
C. C. S. 428 (Revised)

[Washington?] 15 December 1943.

Implementations of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War 1943–1944

Availability of Resources To Meet the Requirements of Critical Strategy

the problem

1. To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated in C. C. S. 426/1.²

facts bearing on the problem

2. The basis of investigation is given in Annex I.³

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at Sextant are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories.

5. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned.

conclusions

6. Ground Forces (Annex II)

The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should preclude the operations.

7. Naval Forces (Annex III)

So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.

8. Air Forces (Annex IV)

The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be available with the following exceptions:

a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the detailed plan to be made for Anvil requires more than a one brigade lift.

b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the additional resources required.

c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma.

Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive.

9. Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)

Production of combat loaders, LST’s and LCT’s still continues to be the bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 1944 there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations.

The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments.

10. Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)

In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI. In no case, however, is it considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of approved operations.

11. Shipping (Annex VII)⁴

Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation Hercules in spring 1944. In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo resources.

12. Oil (Annex VIII)

An examination of the oil position has revealed that the most critical petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during February 1944. It is believed that the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant building program.

In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

1. C. C. S. 428 (not printed herein) was considered and amended at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on December 7, 1943 (see ante, p. 759). The revision of C. C. S. 428 which incorporated the amendments of December 7, 1943, was circulated on December 15, 1943, and is reproduced here.
2. Ante, p. 810.
3. The annexes to this report are not reproduced herein.
4. Discussions of shipping, at the Second Cairo Conference, were conducted largely by Douglas and Leathers. In those discussions it was agreed, among other things, (1) that in the first quarter of 1944, subject to further review, coal should be carried from South Africa and India to Italy by United States shipping; (2) that the movement of coal to the Middle East and North Africa should remain a British responsibility; and (3) that a joint study should be made of certain ships moving in ballast, in connection with the question whether the United States should make up an expected deficit in shipping needed for imports to the United Kingdom. Other shipping problems dealt with at the Conference included the transportation of wheat to Italy and of coal to Latin America, and the provision of shipping to meet the import requirements of the British Dominions. On a number of points, a definite resolution of the problems discussed was not achieved until after the close of the Conference. Documentation of these technical discussions, chiefly in the records of the Maritime Administration and the War Department (messages sent via Army channels) is not printed herein. See, however, Catherine B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 380–381, 394–395, 400–401.