Office of the Historian

J. C. S. Files: Telegram

The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (Mountbatten) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

secret
Seacos 381
[New Delhi?] December 6, 1943.

Following for COS from Mountbatten

1.
Your 051430 Dec.2 para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:
a.
In view of enemy’s powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.
b.
Buccaneer was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worth while operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.
c.
There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.
2.
I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.
3.
Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn3 1, Escorts 3.
4.
The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.
5.
Cancellation of Buccaneer must inevitably lead to collapse of Tarzan since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in “hump” tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:
a.
That Tarzan in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.
b.
It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG’s but in conjunction with
c.
An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [Kalewa] area.
d.
The Arakan operations would remain as in Tarzan.
e.
The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.
7.4
It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram5 will not enable me to achieve the Quadrant Directive of opening up the land route to China6 but it has certain merits. [Page 817]
a.
It enables the LRPG’s to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.
b.
It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.
c.
The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.
d.
It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.
8.
The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of Tarzan so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.
  1. Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C. C. S. 427/1, December 6, 1943.↩
  2. Annex printed ante, p. 724.↩
  3. This may refer to H. M. S. Unicorn, an aircraft maintenance ship.↩
  4. It does not appear that there was any paragraph 6 in this message.↩
  5. Not printed herein. The code word was Gripfast.↩
  6. See Ehrman, vol. v, p. 14.↩