I did not get a chance to give you all the information I had gathered
from the British Joint Secretaries on this matter of Civil Affairs.
I did not think that I could or should talk very much at lunch in
front of Lord Leathers.
The British Combined Chiefs of Staff, I find, likewise agree with us
and so does Sir John Dill. I
had dinner with Cunningham
and Brooke last night and
they gave every indication of their concurrence. I am seeing
Eden in the morning and in
the meantime I am giving you herewith two papers which I believe
could serve as the basis for the briefing of the President. I have
an idea that the Prime Minister is going to bring the matter up on
the way north.1 Don’t allow any commitments to be made until the
President understands all the implications. I hope that Eden, Winant and I can work out something. In the
meantime, I will stick around and await further word from you as to
what if any help I can be on this or any other subject.
[Attachment 1]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
War (McCloy)
secret
Memorandum
There has been a very definite and noticeable effort in the past
few months on the part of the British government to transfer to
London all determinations of our occupational and post-hostility
policy. It has been the policy of the American government to
base considerations of civil administration in liberated or
occupied territory primarily on military policy so long as the
war continues. On the American side provision was made for
obtaining the views of the political and economic side of the
government but the machinery for this was lodged in the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. The British were, of course, a part of this
machinery and by means of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee a
program was carried out with respect to Sicily and Italy, which
was mutually satisfactory. As the program developed, however,
and issues arose which had to be referred to London, a strong
tendency on the part of London developed to limit the activities
of the CCAC, ending in what
amounted to a complete frustration of the committee. As to
Western Europe, London took the position that no matters at all
could be discussed, and even in respect to Italy methods
[Page 417]
were employed to avoid
consideration of such matters by the Committee. Examples of this
circumvention were the Norwegian Agreement2 and
the comprehensive surrender terms for Italy.3
Today we are at an impasse in getting work done because of this
conflict and presumably some attempt will be made at the
forthcoming conference to settle it.
There is more involved than the usual conflict of jurisdiction
between agencies. It is, or may be a development that may affect
the attitude of the U. S. toward all post-hostility policy. The
introduction at Moscow of the plan for the Advisory Commission
on European Affairs with its site in London4 is of large
significance and it was particularly so as Eden first proposed the plan.
There was no great enthusiasm for it on the part of the Soviet
Union and certainly the U. S. representatives there had a very
restricted view of its powers. However, as the thing is now
developing, and the scope of the matters which appear to be on
the verge of consideration by it increases, it seems inevitable
that its conclusions will have gathered such momentum that it
will be most difficult either to disregard them or to relegate
them to minor importance.
It should always be recognized, however, that in the long run the
prejudice of the American people to European conferences is
profound; that there is a constant fear that the Atlantic
theater of war will be weighted against the Pacific, and that
the nature and extent of our participation in Europe and world
politics have yet to be determined. As the war progresses toward
a favorable conclusion two great tendencies will develop. One is
the desire, stimulated on the part of our soldiers by their wish
to get home, to liquidate the European involvement. The national
reaction which followed the last war both in the U. S. and
Canada will set in again though presumably with considerably
less chance of success. The other great tendency will be the
feeling on the part of other countries that now that the war is
on its way to being won and the invader is no longer at the
door, the dependence on the U. S. should promptly be liquidated
except in matters of relief. The development of both tendencies
is fatal to both British and American interests. The Prime
Minister has written it down as one of the great achievements of
his career that his policy was so guided as to make it clear to
America that she must enter the war on
[Page 418]
the side of Britain—“But westward lo the
sky is bright.” It may be more of an achievement and of more
importance to Britain, in the long run, to convince America that
she must enter the administration of the peace.
Twice within a generation Britain has had to have American aid in
order to cope with a European attack. The resources on which she
must draw are, in great quantity, located on the American
continent and strong as Britain may feel herself to be after
each successful war, other wars are coming and there is no
certainty of either avoiding or winning them without the fullest
communion with America. People on both sides give firm utterance
to this sentiment, but it takes doing.
One of the best ways to do it is to convince the United States,
not only its leaders, but its citizens, that the United States
has a major part in directing the war.
It is vitally necessary to indoctrinate the American people to a
recognition of the national responsibility of the country in
world affairs. It is essential that the people of America become
used to decisions being made in the United States. On every
cracker barrel in every country store in the U. S. there is
someone sitting who is convinced that we get hornswoggled every
time we attend a European conference. European deliberations
must be made in the light of the concepts of the new continent
because that continent has now, for better or for worse, become
a determining factor in the struggles of the older one. What may
be lost through not moving to London in the way of better and
more accessible records or a greater familiarity with local
conditions, will be made up in a readier assumption of
responsibility on the part of the U. S. and perhaps in a greater
objectivity of decision.
All this and more can be said against the spirit which motivates
the London tendency. One cannot control the shift of power (if
that is the heart of the matter) by such artificial devices in
any event.
The immediate question, however, is what machinery to erect which
will most satisfactorily take into account these imponderables
and yet get the necessary work done in time to be of effect.
The British proposal to shift the Combined Committee to London is
no solution as it merely accentuates the tendency. The British
proposal would leave the American Committee to determine only
matters of supply, which is no concession whatever as the U. S.
will have to make by far the greater contribution of material in
any event. In all other purposes the American Committee would
become no more than a sort of amanuensis for the decisions of
the London Committee. The proposal is basically objectionable.
Moreover, there is no procedural or practical need for it.
[Page 419]
The CCAC has operated
efficiently. Even the British members have testified to the
directness and highly satisfactory character of the decisions
and the discussions which it produces. It affords a very simple
method by which the attitude of the American Government on all
occupational and cessation of hostility questions can be
learned. In Mr. Dunn the
Committee has a State Department representative very close to
Mr. Hull and through the
Chairman prompt definitions of American policy where needed can
be cleared by the Secretary of War, Mr. Hopkins, or Admiral Leahy. General Hilldring enjoys the confidence
and respect of General Marshall and has ready access to him. The
Committee’s connections with the Treasury are excellent, and
Treasury policy is always available.
The Committee is an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It
is military in its aspect although the Chairman is the Assistant
Secretary of War. In his absence General Hilldring or General MacCready
[Macready] succeeds to the chair. The
connection of the Committee with the Combined Chiefs of Staff
and its military aspect are consistent with the American point
of view that during the progress of the war the introduction to
all political decisions should be based on military
consideration.
In short, the existing Committee has functioned well in the past,
has prompt means of clearing American policy, and is readily
available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as it should be.
It is readily recognized, however, that all decisions cannot be
made from Washington and there must be set up in London a
machinery whereby detailed plans can be made and on-the-spot
questions settled.
It has never been the policy of the Washington Committee to do
more than prescribe the bare outline of the policy to be
followed in each country. The general directive, e. g., the
Husky directive,5 does not purport
to do anything more. For the day-to-day planning for civil
affairs the people on the ground must have the responsibility.
That planning, to be effectively tied into the operations, must
take place in the particular headquarters involved, e. g., for
France in COSSAC. It will
become the duty of that headquarters to take the Combined Chiefs
of Staff directive, put it in force with such additions as local
circumstances require. It will thus be made available for use by
the commanders of the operation and the chief civil affairs
officer of the expedition.
In practice no need has developed for a London Combined Committee
except at the detailed planning level. The overall policy will
[Page 420]
be established by
the advisory council as it is cleared by the respective
governments. That policy is communicable to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff and the CCAC of that
body can translate it into military directives as it has in the
past. If the Washington Committee had been permitted to function
no difficulty would have ensued and none will ensue if London
permits the British members of it to operate. On the other hand
to center in London the Advisory Council,6 the Combined Committee and the detailed
planning centralizes too much authority on vital post-war
questions in London for the interests of both the U. S. and
Britain.
[Attachment 2]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
War (McCloy)7
secret
[Cairo,] 22 November 1943.
Problem
1. At the Moscow Conference there was established the European
Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the U. S., U.
K., and Soviet Governments.8 The
commission will sit in London as soon as possible to make
recommendations with respect to matters connected with the
cessation of hostilities in occupied and liberated countries. As
the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the commission
are closely connected with military considerations it becomes
necessary to establish a procedure [by?] which the Combined
Chiefs of Staff may be advised of and can act upon such policies
as are recommended by such Council and are approved by the
respective governments.
Discussion
2. a. The European Advisory Commission
will be called upon for recommendations as to the terms of
surrender to be imposed upon each of the European enemy states
and as to the machinery required to execute these terms. It will
also deal with such policy questions relating to Axis-occupied
friendly nations as are referred to it. It is indicated further
that the Commission will study [such?] other questions connected
with and flowing from the cessation of hostilities in Europe as
are referred to it by agreement of the three governments.
[Page 421]
b. With respect to all of its
deliberations, the Commission has no executive power and is
confined to the position of making recommendations within its
field to the respective governments.
3. When the Commission starts operating, it is envisaged that
each Government will examine and reconcile the recommendations
of the Commission with its own national policies and transmit
its views as so reconciled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
4. It will become the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff to resolve these views into military directives for the
appropriate Supreme Allied Commander. In conforming to this
responsibility it is contemplated that the Combined Civil
Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will combine
to perform the function of preparing suggested forms of
directives based upon the necessary political and military
considerations and conforming to the reconciled views of the
respective governments. It will also combine to act in an
advisory and planning capacity to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
on all matters relative to civil affairs. It has been suggested
that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be transferred to
London or that a new committee performing substantially the same
functions be set up in London.
This is objectionable from the U. S. point of view for the
following reasons:
- a.
- In order to perform its functions adequately and
expeditiously it is necessary that the Committee should
be near the Combined Chiefs of Staff which must remain
in Washington.
- b.
- The military aspect of the initial stages of civil
affairs planning should continue to be emphasized as
long as either the war against Germany or Japan lasts.
To establish a Combined Committee on a ministerial level
would be inconsistent with this policy. The existing
committee is merely an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
- c.
- The existing committee is experienced and well known;
it has facilities for promptly clearing U. S. national
policy and has operated (until recently when its
activities were restricted through the limitations
imposed on the British representatives) efficiently and
expeditiously.
As it is not the function or intention of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff to do any more than prescribe to the broadest terms of the
policies under which the commanders in the field are to be
guided there is no force to the argument that all procedures be
transferred to London as greater information and contacts are
available there. The methods and details by which the policy is
to be carried out and as to which the information contacts and
skills will be most useful are matters for the Civil Affairs
Division of the appropriate headquarters
[Page 422]
to work out. (In the case of France and
the Low Countries, presumably COSSAC).
Conclusion
The existing arrangement whereby the Combined Chiefs of Staff
operating from Washington and utilizing the services of the
Combined Civil Affairs Committee furnish basic directives
governing civil affairs and matters relating to the cessation of
hostilities to the appropriate combined commanders should be
continued.
The U. K. and U. S. Governments should state to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff their views in matters relating to civil affairs
and the cessation of hostilities; these matters may be referred
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either on their own initiative
or as a result of the action taken of the European Advisory
Commission.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff in any directives carried to the
appropriate commanders shall follow the normal practice of
confining such directives to basic matters, leaving to the
commanders and their staff the duty of working out the methods
and details by which the policies as stated in such directives
shall be executed.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the two governments agree to the
conclusions set forth above and that for this purpose the
Combined Chiefs of Staff transmit to the two governments a
letter in substantially the form attached hereto as Enclosure
A.9
