Defense Files
Memorandum of Conversation1
Mr. Winant started out by stating our concern, from the point of view of progressing with our planning, over the extent of the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission and the early introduction of the political aspect into the cessation of hostility planning. I then outlined to Eden the inadvisability, from the point of view of U. S. participation in the peace and the reconstruction of Europe, of concentrating too much post hostility planning and decision making in London or of removing the military aspect of such planning, at least while the war was going on. Mr. Eden asked whether it was our desire or intention to play down the Moscow Conference agreements in respect to the EAC.2 I told him that I thought too much had been referred to it as a practical matter for it to absorb at the start and the result might well be a serious lack of progress.
When I touched on the necessity of avoiding even the suggestion of moving all these decisions to London and spoke of the need for indulging American sensitivities on these matters if the U. S. was to be a real participant in the peace, he rather strongly reacted. It was clear that he considered the setting up of the London Commission as an achievement of some proportions; that it had Mr. Hull’s accord and thus the accord of the U. S. government; that whether for better or worse the entire kit and kiboodle had been referred and it would not do to indicate to the Soviets that any attempt was being made to derogate from the jurisdiction of the Commission now. I told him that the U. S., of course, intended to go ahead with the decisions made in Moscow and to bring the Soviets into our councils. This was recognized on all sides as desirable and necessary. The question was a matter of getting on with work that must be done. Already due to the attitude of some agencies in London, the British side of the CCAC, who in themselves were able and reasonable men if given some authority, were completely tongue-tied. The thing to do was to avoid playing up the EAC as the great decider of all post hostility questions; to have the EAC prior to submitting their proposed recommendations to the governments, obtain the comments of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From there on the recommendations of the EAC can be transmitted to the governments for approval and thence to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis for directives to the commanders in the field. Mr. Eden expressed agreement with this procedure [Page 353] and Mr. Jebb, who was with him, also seemed in favor of this arrangement but indicated to Mr. Eden that “London” would be much opposed, i. e., they wanted to shift the CCAC to London. Although no arrangements were confirmed, Mr. Eden indicated he favored this arrangement and would endeavor to carry it into effect. He also said that he thought it wise that no further pressure be exerted toward shifting the functions of the Combined Committee to London.
Winant spoke of the need for a good staff in London to help him out and Mr. Eden said this was most important. He urged that a good military man be sent over immediately (and a good State Department man). He said that if we would agree to treat the EAC seriously he would see that the tongues and minds of the British representatives on the CCAC would be loosened and that he thought that further pressure to set up a CCAC in London would be removed. We touched on many other related things which led up to this tentative conclusion. The discussion was animated at times, but frank.
In the evening Mr. Jebb came to dinner as did Major Morton who briefs the Prime Minister on these matters. Jebb, who was going farther north and east,3 said that after talking with Eden further and consulting Redman and others, the general view among them, again subject to “London” (whatever that means) was that an arrangement would be worked out whereby the tentative recommendations of the EAC would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their comment and suggestions before being submitted to the governments; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could refer the matter to the CCAC for advice and the comments could then be returned to the EAC for final submission to the governments which by that time would have been for all practical purposes already in agreement. Thereafter the translation of the policy into the terms of a directive can be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He urged that when the recommendations were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that we would not take them apart and start all over again. I assured him that we only wanted to make progress and that I could guarantee we would act expeditiously and reasonably.
I told him that though it might not be advisable to suggest to the Soviet member at the outset that certain matters be carved out of the jurisdiction of the Commission, I did feel as a matter of practice they would find that the Advisory Commission would have enough to do to concentrate on broad matters of policy rather than on details of planning which had better be done at COSSAC Headquarters than either in the EAC or Washington. He agreed. Finally I told Mr. Jebb that I thought that unless we could make such an arrangement [Page 354] as that outlined we would reach a further impasse and nothing of any substance would result from the London Commission. I indicated to Mr. Eden that Mr. Hull had suggested a Combined Committee to deal with French matters4 and this immediately produced a favorable reaction. He asked that study be given to the question of how and where it should be set up.
The conference ended with the understanding that on the return of Jebb from the East we should work on an agreement on the respective functions of the EAC, the Combined Committee and COSSAC.5