Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

740.0011 EW 1939/31975: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)¹

Ankara, November 16, 1943—11 p.m.

1884. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

In conversation with the Russian Ambassador² yesterday, after expressing to each other our pleasure at the outcome of the Moscow Conference, the Ambassador said that he had not endeavored to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs³ for some days as he thought it preferable that the British Ambassador⁴ continue his negotiations with Numan for the purpose of establishing whether the Turks were more interested in the military than in the political aspects of their possible entry into the war. In reply to his inquiry as to the impression I had gained on this subject from my talk with the Foreign Minister, I said I was under the impression that since the successful outcome of the Moscow Conference the Turk Government was much more concerned with the military than with the political aspect. Vinogradov said he hoped this would prove to be the case inasmuch as the military aspect was of prime importance to Russia, Great Britain, United States, and Turkey whereas the political aspect if not stressed should not be difficult of solution. He then remarked that Turkey’s entry into the war in the near future would be regarded by his Government as a valuable contribution to the Allied victory but that its deferment to a later date would make the contribution of little, if any, value. Although recognizing the vulnerability of Turk cities to aerial attack and Turk military deficiencies in general, he was not clear as to what if any military assistance could or should be rendered the Turks by any of the Allies. He then remarked that if the Turks were still worried about Russian intentions in the Balkans, he failed to understand why Numan had not asked him to call to discuss the matter.

In conclusion Vinogradov said that unless Numan asked him to come to see him, it was his intention to await the progress of the talks between the British and the Turks before calling on the Foreign Minister.

I gained the impression that Vinogradov has been instructed to take no part in the Anglo-Turk talks but to hold himself in readiness, if called upon by Numan, to discuss Turk anxiety with respect to Russian intentions in the Balkans.

Repeated to Moscow.

Steinhardt

1. No record has been found of the forwarding of this message to Roosevelt, who was aboard the U. S. S. Iowa en route to Africa at this time.
2. Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.
3. Numan Menemencioğlu.
4. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.