Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Minutes of the Presidents Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 15, 1943, 2 P.M., Presidents Cabin, U. S. S. “Iowa”¹

Moscow, November 15, 1943, 2 p.m.

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3. Rearmament of French Forces

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With regard to the matter of rearming of French forces, The President read a recent telegram from the Prime Minister² wherein he said he was much disturbed about the fact that De Gaulle had thrown out Giraud.

General Marshall observed that we were committed to equipping the French to the extent of 11 or 12 divisions unless this matter should be stopped soon.

Admiral Leahy suggested that General Eisenhower be interrogated as to whether he really needed these particular French divisions which were to be equipped.

The President pointed out that while the paper provided for the equipping of 11 French divisions, only about 9 of them would be effective. He felt that we should go ahead with the plans to equip these divisions but not commit ourselves beyond the present commitments.

Admiral Leahy felt that it might be desirable to delay on equipping the 11 divisions in question in that when they were equipped De Gaulle would undoubtedly use them as a lever with which to enhance his own position. He again suggested that General Eisenhower be questioned, as to the need for equipping these divisions.

The President observed that he understood General Eisenhower wants to use the 11 divisions.

Admiral King said he believed that De Gaulle was constantly increasing his prestige and would certainly take advantage of these 11 divisions to further strengthen his position.

Admiral Leahy said that De Gaulle plans to use 9 divisions to solidify his own position in France. If De Gaulle gets into France with say 10 well equipped divisions, he can readily take charge of the Government of France by force.

Gen. Marshall agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not say anything about this matter until after they had had an opportunity to talk with General Eisenhower. This would give General Eisenhower an “easy out”, i. e., provide the French with equipment as we move out; in other words, not ship in any additional equipment for the French but transfer United States equipment as United States troops go out.

The President observed that the British wanted to build up France into a first class power, which would be on the British side. He said it was his opinion that France would certainly not again become a first class power for at least 25 years.

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6. United Nations Strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean

(J. C. S. 558 and 558/1)³

The President then read the proposed policy regarding the United Nations strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean area presented to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J. C. S. 558 & 558/1). The President said as far as he was concerned—Amen. The paper was “okay” and approved by him. He added that he felt we should send the paper to the British and during the first few days of the Sextant Conference definitely stand on it.⁴

7. Command

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now considering the very involved subject of high command in Europe and the Pacific.⁵

The President said that it was his idea that General Marshall should be the commander in chief against Germany and command all the British, French, Italian and U. S. troops involved in this effort.

8. Rome an Open City

Admiral Leahy brought up the matter of Rome as an open city (J. C. S. 463/2 and 463/3.³)

The President said he felt that we should leave this matter up to General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower knows that we do not want to burn Rome.

General Marshall pointed out that in General Eisenhower’s reply regarding Rome as an open city⁷ he had said that it would be necessary to set up the Italian Government in Rome. He felt that we could be placed in a difficult position in this matter if we moved now to refer it to the Germans. They could delay reply until the time for their withdrawal was imminent and then propose Rome as an open city without any restrictions, which would deny us the vitally necessary communications through the Rome district as well as the freedom to set up the Italian Government headquarters in Rome, which General Eisenhower regarded as an important necessity. It was not likely that with Berlin and London under bombardment the Germans would agree to the Italian Government being protected against such measures. He felt we should do nothing about Rome at this time.

Mr. Hopkins said that from a political point of view it would be worthwhile making Rome an open city. If, on the other hand, the Germans are getting ready to move out, it would probably be better to let the matter ride at this time as the United Nations definitely need the communication and transit facilities of Rome.

Admiral Leahy said that he still believed from a domestic, political point of view we should accept the original Italian proposal.⁸ He felt that it should have been accepted two months ago.

The President observed that we had as yet received no final report about the plane which recently bombed the Vatican. It was his opinion that the question of whether or not Rome should be declared an open city should be delayed for the present and that matters regarding this subject should be decided upon an “episode basis.” He pointed out that the Germans might desire to use Rome as a pivot and it would be preferable to do nothing about this matter at this time.

General Marshall said that it was General Eisenhower’s intention to encircle Rome by an amphibious movement of one division, probably reinforced by certain units from a second (airborne) division.

9. The Italian Government

With regard to the matter of the Italian Government, The President observed that the British are definitely monarchists and want to keep kings on their thrones. They are monarchist-minded. He then quoted from a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. McMillan [Macmillan].⁹ He observed that the British are definitely anti-Sforza. He added that the paper before him contained an extensive discussion of background by the British Foreign Office. While we would like to get the King out, at the same time General Eisenhower wants to get to Rome before there is any “bust-up.”

The President said that he felt we should go along with “Ike”.

Mr. Hopkins observed that the Prime Minister is again using his old tactics and that he wants to go back to the old system. He evidently really desires a status quo as regards monarchies but would possibly be in a position to blame the United States for any overthrow of the King.

Admiral Leahy questioned whether it would make any difference to the United States whether King Emanuel stays or not.

The President pointed out that we cannot sit tight after we get to Rome because we have promised the Italians a plebiscite.¹⁰

Admiral King recommended that we let the situation solve itself.

10. Trusteeship

The President referred to a recent memorandum from Mr. Stettinius with regard to the matter of “trusteeship”, particularly as regards places in the Pacific.¹¹ He felt that we should keep in mind the matter of “trusteeship” and that this form of administration presents itself to [as?] a very satisfactory solution of the government of ex-enemy territory.

11. Documentation of the Moscow Conference

The President handed the U. S. Secretary¹² an envelope containing the documentation of the Moscow Conference¹³ which had been presented to him by Mr. Hull. It was directed that this paper be circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their perusal.

12. Civil Affairs

The President said that he had been informed that the British were proposing to acquire a large building in London in which could be set up a United Nations civil affairs administration. He said that it was evident that the British contemplated a very large Secretariat and it was a question as to whether we should match them with a large Secretariat or go into the matter on a smaller scale. He pointed out that regardless of the extent of the Civil Affairs Secretariat, decisions on major matters would have to be made by himself, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. The Secretariat itself would have no authority to make decisions. He pointed out that if the Secretariat became too large and unwieldy, it might become more than “advisory”.

General Marshall suggested the possibility of assigning to this proposed Civil Affairs Secretariat a small, very able planning group.

Mr. Hopkins said that just before the Presidential party left Washington, General Macready informed him that he had gotten a wire that the entire question of Combined Civil Affairs Committee versus the British idea of a large Civil Affairs Secretariat in London would be put on the table by the British at Sextant. He pointed out as it now stood the Soviets were not represented on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. He added that Mr. McCloy had been concerned with the “headache” of printing money for use in France. He said that it has been heard from London that all things of this sort will be settled and take place there.

Mr. Hopkins felt that the matter should be watched with great care lest the military layout be placed in jeopardy. He considered that this matter was a very tricky business and added that he believed the Soviets would not take the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

The President pointed out that General De Gaulle will be right behind the army when there is penetration into France and take over by his faction as rapidly as the army advances.

Mr. Hopkins said that he had talked to several of the State Department people who accompanied Mr. Hull to Moscow. These gentlemen felt that the Soviets were not particularly interested in playing up the proposed large Civil Affairs Secretariat.

The President observed that Mr. Hull’s memorandum on [in?] the documentation of the Moscow Conference differed considerably from some of the cables.

Mr. Hopkins said that he bet Mr. Eden would be at Sextant.

General Marshall said that any move to remove the center of gravity from Washington to London concerns him extremely.

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15. Agenda for Coming Conference

The President said he hoped to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 22 November. He said he proposed to assign General Somervell to take care of Madame, if she comes. He said that he desired the meeting with the Generalissimo and himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be separate from and precede any meeting with the British. He said he would like to see a proposed agenda for his meeting with (1) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) with Prime Minister Churchill; and (3) with Marshal Stalin.

The Secretary was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrange to have the proposed draft agenda drawn up by the Planners.¹⁴

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1. Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal. For additional excerpts from the minutes of this meeting, see ante, p. 86. See also Matloff, pp. 338–339.
2. Ante, p. 174.
3. Neither printed herein.
4. The paper as presented became C. C. S. 402, post, p. 210.
5. The J. C. S. proposals on this subject are printed post, p. 203.
3. Neither printed herein.
7. Eisenhower to the War Department for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 1943 (740.0011 EW 1939/31953a); not printed herein.
8. The Italian proposal was set forth in a memorandum of August 26, 1943, from the Apostolic Delegate at Washington to the Department of State, post, p. 268.
9. No pertinent message from Macmillan to Churchill has been found in the Roosevelt Papers. The paper which Roosevelt had before him at this meeting may be a telegram of September 17, 1943, from the British Foreign Office to Macmillan at Algiers, which was made available by the British Government to the Department of State via the British Embassy at Washington and, on September 18, was forwarded by the Department to Roosevelt; not printed herein (Roosevelt Papers). It contained a paragraph on Sforza’s role in Italian politics.
10. In a radio broadcast of July 28, 1943, Roosevelt had said: “Eventually Italy will reconstitute herself. It will be the people of Italy who will do that, choosing their own government in accordance with the basic democratic principles of liberty and equality.” Department of State Bulletin, vol. ix, July 31, 1943, p. 57.
11. Ante, p. 167.
12. Captain Forrest B. Royal.
13. The records of the Moscow Conference are scheduled to be published in Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i.
14. See post, p. 245.