Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

740.0011 EW 1939/31932: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)¹

Ankara, November 14, 1943—1 p.m.

1868. Most secret for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs² last night gave me a detailed account of his conversations with Eden in Cairo and his subsequent talks with the British Ambassador in Ankara.³ He promised to send me a copy of the minutes of his meeting with the dean [Eden?] as soon as they are prepared which I will transmit when received.⁴ The main points he emphasized in his conversations with me were:

(1) The Turkish Government prefers to discuss Turkey’s entry into the war rather than the mere granting of air bases as in its opinion the granting of air bases would inevitably involve Turkey’s entrance into the war.

(2) Eden, although proposing action by Turkey tantamount to entry into the war, failed to indicate what if any assistance the Turks might expect from the Allies.

(3) The Turkish Army is not equipped for offensive action and in consequence the Turkish Government must anticipate the devastation of Istanbul and Izmir, their only two large cities, with a substantial part of the population of these two cities homeless during the winter, its railroad system paralyzed by the destruction of innumerable bridges and trestles with the resultant demoralization of the transportation system leading to starvation in many areas and a general economic breakdown, unless it is satisfied that adequate aerial protection will be made available by the Allies.

(4) The readiness of the Turks to sanction Turkey’s entry into war has been adversely affected by the failure of the British to send adequate forces to take over and hold the islands in the Aegean.

(5) In the absence of strong Allied forces in or immediately available to Turkey, particularly aviation, the Turkish Government must consider the probability of a violent Axis reaction to the granting of air bases or other acts of war which might lead to an invasion of Turkey and the devastation of the country to no advantage, while at the same time the Allies would presumably be obliged to send large forces to stem a German drive into the Near East. Should the Germans desire an easy victory to restore their prestige the foregoing probability would become a certainty.

(6) The request of Eden that Turkey grant air bases or enter the war prior to December 3 affords insufficient time to make the necessary military preparations and to prepare public opinion.

(7) It was unreasonable for Eden [to] ask for air bases or for Turkey’s entrance into the war without at least a partial disclosure of Allied military plans in respect of the Near East and the Balkans.

(8) There would not be the slightest hesitation on the part of the Turkish Government to enter the war were Anglo-American forces to land in the Balkans as this would imply the availability of adequate Allied forces to support Turkey.

After summarizing his talks with Eden Numan said that the President and Cabinet had been in virtually continuous session since his return from Cairo and that he was having difficulty with some members of the Cabinet who were opposed to Turkey’s abandoning its neutrality. He said he was also being embarrassed by insistent demands from various members of Parliament (which is now in session) for information as to his talks with Eden and the course which the Government proposes to pursue. He said it would be necessary for him, within the next few days, to reply publicly to these questions and that in so doing he intended to refer to Turkey’s obligations under the Turkish-British alliance⁵ and would endeavor to make a noncommittal statement. He added that to avoid undesirable repercussions in the Turkish or Anglo-American-Soviet press the Turkish newspapers would be severely restricted in what they would be permitted to print and that the Turkish censors would scrutinize the despatches of the foreign correspondents with the utmost care.

Numan then said that a meeting of the President and the Cabinet would be held today at which the Turkish reply to Eden’s proposals would be formulated. He observed that although he was not as yet certain of the nature of the reply, if he was successful in overcoming the opposition of some members of the Cabinet, the reply would in substance express Turkey’s readiness in principle to enter the war and at same time it would set forth Turkey’s military deficiencies and stress the dangers of precipitous action in the absence of military program involving adequate support for Turkey.

Numan intimated that in drafting the Turkish reply he would endeavor to avoid even the appearance of specifying conditions of Turkey’s entry into the war but would seek rather to set forth the circumstances under which Turkey’s entry would be effective and produce the desired results without running the risk of disaster for Turkey and the consequent damage to Allied military plans and prestige.

Numan said he would send me a copy of the Turkish Government’s reply to Eden’s proposals⁶ and as Eden had stated that he also spoke on behalf of the Americans and Russians it was his intention to instruct the Turkish Ambassadors in Washington and Moscow to deliver copies to the American and Russian Foreign Ministers.

Throughout our talk I was forcibly struck by the extreme frankness with which Numan discussed Turkey’s probable entry into the war. I gained the distinct impression that the Turkish Government has already decided in principle to enter the war and to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Allies but that it is convinced that certain conditions precedent to its entry are vital not only in its own interests but in those of the Allies as well. These conditions grow out of a sober recognition by the Turkish Government of its military deficiencies and economic weaknesses and the realization that without adequate Allied forces immediately available disaster may result from the country’s premature entry into the war. Numan however made it unmistakably clear to me that the Turkish Government is quite prepared and expects to make what he described as its contribution in blood, suffering and devastation of its country to the Allied victory but that such contribution should serve a useful purpose in furthering the Allied cause which Turkey wholeheartedly espouses and not entail needless sacrifices occasioned by precipitous action with inadequate forces which could only result in Turkey becoming a liability rather than an asset to the Allies.

Steinhardt

1. A slightly abbreviated paraphrase of this telegram was sent by the White House Map Room to Greer on November 17, 1943, apparently via military channels, “to be held for delivery to the President upon arrival at Oran.” Roosevelt arrived at Oran on November 20.
2. Numan Menemencioglu.
3. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. Regarding these talks, see ante, pp. 180 and 174.
4. Not found.
5. For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.
6. See Hull’s telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, post, p. 374.