Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President1
No. SD 1. Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.
A problem which is almost certain to arise at the coming conference is Soviet insistence on the importance of Sweden’s cooperation in the war.2 Molotov has made their attitude plain on several occasions since the conference3 ended.
Yesterday I had a talk with the Swedish Minister4 in which he described his talk with Molotov at the reception,5 indicating that although he considered Molotov’s attitude toward him friendly he considered very significant Molotov’s statement criticizing Sweden’s neutrality. He explained further that this subject was intimately connected with Finland’s dropping out of the war[;] also he told me of his talk with Secretary Hull in which the Secretary said that the United States had expressed to Finland our views on the advisability of her dropping out of the war and that this was as far as the United States was prepared to go. The Swedish Minister stated that he considered it probable Finland would withdraw from the war promptly if she could be given assurance that Soviet troops would not occupy Finland under the guise of protecting her from the Germans. Finland would prefer to fight it out with the Germans on her own even though it would mean a difficult period of German occupation. In this connection he said that he considered the United States would be the only effective means of preventing Russian occupation of Finland but that this effectiveness would be considerably reduced if not exercised at once.
Explained to him of course that I could add nothing to what the Secretary had told him. As Sweden was so much interested in the Finnish withdrawal from the war before it was too late, I asked [Page 183] whether he considered Sweden could do anything about it on their own. He said the Swedes would be ready to supply Finland with food for the next six months which would be necessary when shipments from Germany stopped, and perhaps take other steps which would risk German retaliation, but he was not optimistic about Sweden being able to influence the Soviet Government’s present determination to occupy Finland. He said he considered that the next few weeks was the critical time and that they were certainly ready to advise the Finns, if they had the opportunity, to accept harsh terms from the Soviet Government now rather than very much harsher terms if they continued in the war, but he was not optimistic that this would move the Finnish Government in time.
It was his opinion that the Finnish Government were placing too much reliance upon the goodwill of the United States in its effect on their future status and that they did not realize it was their responsibility to work their problems out with the Soviet Government on their own.
As to Sweden’s participation in the War, the Swedish Minister indicated that the Swedes he thought were ready to take certain risks. He himself would be ready to go further than the Swedish Government. He pointed out that it was the ambition of the King to lead his people through the war without the suffering that would come from participation. He talked quite frankly about the difficulties that neutrality to the end would present in their permanent relations with the Soviet Government and indicate[d] that he considered the Swedish Government should weigh this seriously as against the policy pursued up to now by the King and his advisors.
I have the feeling that the Swedish Minister was anxious to get advice from me. As I have no instructions I avoided expressing any opinion.
- Apparently sent via military channels. The message bears the following handwritten notation: “To take up with Mr. Churchill”.↩
- See ante, pp. 135–136.↩
- Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.↩
- Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson.↩
- Reception given by the Soviet Government on November 7, 1943, the anniversary of the revolution of 1917.↩