Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
C.C.S. 380/2

[Washington,] 6 November 1943.

Basic Policies for the Next United States-British Staff Conference

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of basic strategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United States-British Staff Conference, it being understood that such agreement does not exclude from consideration courses of action which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

I. Over-all Objective

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.

1. A note of November 6, 1943, by the Combined Secretariat states that this paper, “approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 126th Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” The meeting referred to was held at Washington on November 5, 1943. For the acceptance by the Combined Chiefs, on November 22, 1943, of the strategic concept and basic undertakings set forth in this paper, see post, p. 307.