851.01/6582/5
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)
| Participants: | The Secretary; |
| M. Tixier and Admiral D’Argenlieu, both of the Free French Movement; | |
| Mr. Atherton. |
These gentlemen called on me by appointment made at their request and the conversation was carried on in French and English.
Admiral D’Argenlieu began the conversation by an expression of appreciation of his prompt reception by the State Department since he wished to have his first indications of American policy direct from headquarters. He would also like to state that he was returning from his Pacific post to London with the most happy impressions of his cooperation with the American forces in the Far East. There had been very much distorted rumors of friction between himself and General Patch83a but it was obvious that in the first days of a military arrival amounting to some 25,000 American troops in New Caledonia the political, civilian and military questions could not be [Page 551] solved at once and there was for two or three days a certain tension which happily was dispelled into extremely cordial relations which had existed ever since. These relations of extreme cordiality were not confined to New Caledonia only but likewise in the Admiral’s travels through Australia. He had the closest relations with the American Consuls concerned with New Caledonia, General MacArthur84 and indeed his prompt and easy journey to San Francisco by plane was entirely due to the kindly attitude of the American Army.
The Secretary stated that he welcomed the Admiral not only because of the collaboration that he had shown with the United States in the Pacific but also because he was proceeding to London and, with knowledge of the importance of his fresh judgment on the scene there, Mr. Hull was anxious to outline in full the American point of view in its fight for victory over the Axis and, more especially, in the ever developing and ever changing North African military scene. Mr. Hull then reviewed at some length American military policy beginning with the assurances obtained from the Vichy Government in 1940 regarding the French fleet. He referred to his first conversation with the French Ambassador here stating that although we were going to assume all the outward forms of diplomatic contact with the French Government at Vichy we had not that confidence that would permit us to maintain this more than from a day to day basis. Our reasons for maintaining this contact were American reasons in that it permitted us the establishment of observation points within enemy territory and due to our North African agreement it permitted us a series of observers in addition. Besides all this it gave us the greatest opportunity of all, that is, contact with the French people themselves.
Mr. Hull stressed particularly the phases of American policy whereby every Frenchman who resisted aggression of the Axis could count on the friendship and support of the United States and said that on this basis we were cooperating with Frenchmen the world over, although naturally certain French elements were giving much more to their country than others and this of course was the role of the Fighting French. They were all, however, bound together with us for military victory over the Axis forces.
Mr. Hull then dwelt at some length on the actual situation in North Africa; how General Giraud had been at first the choice of the American military but even this great French General when he had landed in Africa found he was unable to command the support of the French armed forces. Undoubtedly the reason for this was that for two years past Admiral Darlan had been filling all places of importance with his own followers. However, General [Page 552] Giraud was a big enough man to realize that when he could not command the necessary support he was willing to subordinate himself to Admiral Darlan who appeared on the scene entirely unexpectedly but was able to prove that the fighting strength of the French in North Africa as indeed in other places, including Toulon, was under his orders. This military collaboration of Admiral Darlan has saved the lives of many American soldiers even in the first moments of occupation, but when it was added to the lives saved by the collaboration of West Africa as well, the total mounted up into very impressive figures. Also our military plans were advanced by French collaboration by at least sixty days and thus we were sixty days nearer contact with the Germans, sixty days nearer the winning of the war and the final military victory in North Africa which was the common aim of all concerned.
Mr. Hull added that if he were attacked by a thug on the street and someone came to his assistance he would welcome the assistance of his collaborator in destroying the would-be murderer but he would not cease to fight and ask his unexpected collaborator to tell him his name and antecedents. Mr. Hull went on to say that in war time one should be wary of politicians. He had been a politician himself all his life and he knew they had limitations in a purely military effort. However, Mr. Hull did think a great deal of the alleged fear of Darlan as a menace to France at this particular moment was somewhat exaggerated since he could not conceive that Darlan in North Africa, an unsettled area that at most had under three million European inhabitants, could impose himself on the French nation of forty-five millions as a political figure if the French people did not wish it, and Mr. Hull added he was quite sure in his own mind the French people did not wish this and therefore Admiral Darlan remained a military figure and his only collaboration with the United States was purely a military arrangement. This was the background against which the President had spoken of any such arrangement with Darlan as purely temporary. Mr. Hull pointed out also that the British and American fleets were in control of the Mediterranean and this in itself controlled Darlan’s approach to France.
The Secretary then went on to say that General de Gaulle was in all eyes a great military figure. He stood for something very special to all Americans in the French situation and it was the prayer of the American people that all Frenchmen who had anything to contribute to a military victory which would restore France to her independence would give their fullest military collaboration in the war against Hitler leaving all policies aside. This earnest expression Mr. Hull wanted personally to convey to Admiral D’Argenlieu.
[Page 553]At the end of the talk M. Tixier stated that he had never had such a clear picture himself and Admiral D’Argenlieu was warm in his appreciation of at last understanding the composite whole of what previously he had only known in varying degrees from outside sources. He said he felt France was worthy of the Secretary’s trust and the Secretary’s support for the restoration of France and her territories.
In leaving M. Tixier said to Mr. Atherton if General de Gaulle ever visited this country he would bring him direct from the airplane to the Secretary’s office that Mr. Hull might make the same explanation to him that he had just made to the Admiral because it was a perfect answer to all or any Fighting French apprehensions.