851.01/7225
The President of the French National Committee at London (de Gaulle) to President Roosevelt 76
Mr. President: [Here follows account of circumstances giving rise to the Free French movement and General de Gaulle’s leadership of the movement.]
I was not a political leader. All my life I had kept strictly within my profession. It is true that before the war I had tried to interest the political leaders in some of my ideas, but it was only to bring to realization some military project for the benefit of the country. Likewise at the time of the Vichy armistice77 it was primarily along military lines that I appealed to the country. When we observed, however, that larger and larger groups responded, that whole territories adhered or were joined to the Fighting French, and that we alone were in a position to act with any form of organization, we saw that larger responsibilities had fallen to us. We have seen in France the growth of a sort of mystical conception directed toward us, and bit by bit uniting all the elements of resistance. Thus we have become, by force of circumstance, a French moral entity. This has created for us duties for which we feel deeply responsible and which we could not avoid without betraying the respect of the country and the hopes placed in us by the French people.
We are told that we should not engage in political activity. If this means that we ought not to take up the former party controversies or dictate the form of government of the country, we need no such advice, because as a matter of principle we abstain from any such pretensions. But we do not hesitate before the word “politics” if it means to rally not only a few troops but the whole French nation in the war, or if it means to deal with our Allies on matters concerning the interests of France at the same time that we defend those interests against the enemy. Who, except ourselves, could represent those interests? Or should France remain silent in matters concerning her affairs? Or should these affairs be discussed with the United Nations by the Vichy people in the manner and form that Hitler may judge appropriate? It is not a question of our self-assertion toward our Allies but consideration of the three [Page 542] following factors which has determined our attitude: Only Frenchmen can be the judge of their national interests; the French people are convinced that when treating with the Allies we speak for the nation just as we fight for its interests at the side of our Allies; in their misfortunes the French people have become extremely sensitive to the fate of their empire, and any appearance of abuse of these interests on the part of any ally is exploited by the enemy and by Vichy in a manner dangerous to the national sensibilities.
Since circumstances unprecedented in our history have given us this task, can we think of imposing upon France some regime of personal power, as some people, chiefly abroad, are suggesting? To have such vile feelings as to want to cheat the French people of their future liberty would be to prove our complete ignorance of our own people. The French nation is in character the most deeply opposed to a regime of personal power. It has never been easy to impose such power, but now, after the odious experience of the personal regime of Pétain which has been possible because of the connivance of the Germans and because of the oppressions in the administration, and after the long and heavy burden of the invasion, who would be absurd enough to imagine that he could establish and maintain a regime of personal power in France? The dreamer who would try that, whatever services he may have rendered to the country in the past, would find the whole nation ranged against him.
It is worth noting, however, that no one in France has accused us of aspiring to dictatorship. Let me refer to the fact that men like Mr. Jouhaux, President of the General Federation of Labor, Mr. Edouard Herriot, Leader of the Radical Party, Mr. Léon Blum, Leader of the Socialist Party, even the leaders of the Communist Party, have placed themselves at our disposition, and have informed us that we can count on them in our work, of which they unreservedly approve both the direction and the aims. Even among our adversaries, not only the Vichy people but also those like Doriot and Déat, there has been no one to accuse us of wanting a dictatorship. They reproach us with being mercenaries paid by the democracies, but they have never reproached us with trying to set up a personal and anti-democratic power in France.
Let me say, Mr. President, that in this immense war which demands the cooperation and unity of every element fighting against the same enemies, wisdom and justice demand that the Fighting French receive real and powerful aid. But apart from the moral and material support which the Allies can give us, and without demanding that we be recognized as the Government of France, we consider that it is necessary that we be consulted (abordé) each time there is question either of the general interests of France, or of French [Page 543] participation in the war, or of the administration of those French territories which the developments of the war may gradually place in a position where they can again take part in it,—territories which have not been able spontaneously to join with us.
Your name and your personality have an enormous prestige in France. France knows that she can count on your friendship. But in your conversations with France, with whom can you speak? Is it the France of yesterday? The men who were the most representative authorize me to say that they are with us. Is it the France of Vichy? Perhaps you think that its leaders might some day take up arms at our side. I regret to say I cannot believe it; but if such a thing were possible, one thing is certain—today they are collaborating with Hitler, and in your conversations with them he is always present as a third party. Is it the France of tomorrow? How can we know what that is, until the leaders can be chosen by a freely constituted assembly? Meanwhile has not the French Nation proved that it has not deserted the camp of the Allies, and that the nation is politically carrying on, in spite of everything, through the agency of our organization, both in a military and in a territorial sense?
I have been told that persons who have access to you (de votre entourage) may be fearful lest in recognizing our existence one would prejudice the chances that certain elements, particularly of a military character, now attached to the Vichy Government, might again take part in the war. But do you believe that by ignoring those Frenchmen who are fighting, and by leaving them in a discouraging isolation, you would attract others for war service? Think of the risk to France, on the other hand, in the fact that her allies seem to be promoting the disintegration of the country by favoring the formation of several rival factions, some of them neutralized by agreement with the Allies themselves, and others trying to fight separately, but for the same cause. After all, have not the two years of bitter experience demonstrated that every element which separated itself from Vichy either found its way to the Fighting French or, if left apart, remained in ineffectual isolation? In the tragic situation in which the French people have been placed they see things very simply. They see that their only choice is between war and capitulation. If the choice is to be war, then it means naturally the Fighting French, and the national instinct rallies them around those in whom they see the symbol of their war effort. In this we have the real explanation of the fact that in spite of the extreme difficulties under which the Fighting French have kept going in the last two years, they have held fast and gained in solidarity.
Notwithstanding the capitulation and the armistice, France still represents a power in the world which must not be ignored. We [Page 544] must find a way for her to return as a participant in the war along with the United Nations while preserving both her susceptibilities and her unity. This is one of the most important problems of the war, and it is for this reason that I ask you to agree to undertake a general and direct examination of the relations between the United States and the Fighting French. Whatever may be the procedure to this end, I believe there is no other way of approaching with complete openness of mind a problem for which I feel with deep conviction, because of the sacred cause for which we are fighting, there must be found a solution.
Accept [etc.]
- This letter was brought to Washington by M. André Philip, a member of General de Gaulle’s National Committee in London, and was handed to Under Secretary of State Welles on or shortly before October 27 for transmittal to President Roosevelt.↩
- Armistice agreement between the German High Command of the Armed Forces and French Plenipotentiaries, signed at Compiegne, June 22, 1940; for text, see Documents on German Forcing Policy, 1919–1945, ser. D. vol. ix, p. 671.↩