740.00112 European War 1939/6318

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)

Mr. Guérin said that he had received a reply from his Government to our proposal to send a tanker loaded with kerosene to North Africa on condition that the movement of cobalt be stopped. [Page 324] He said that the French Government could not give an official undertaking to prohibit the exportation of cobalt from North Africa because it would immediately attract the attention of the German Armistice Commission which had the power to cancel the sailings of all vessels engaged in the North African supply program if it so desired. However, the French authorities were prepared to give unofficial and confidential assurances that no further shipments of cobalt would be made.

Mr. Guérin explained that a few months ago when the North African supply program was suspended and when there was no indication that it would ever be renewed the French had agreed to sell 500 tons of cobalt to the Germans. No French vessels were to be used in this transaction and the Germans were required to make their own arrangements for transportation. It was assumed that those arrangements were now being carried out. A few days ago the Germans had made a strong demand on the French for an additional 1,000 tons of cobalt, and it was this amount as well as all further amounts of cobalt which the French have now agreed unofficially to stop.

I said that we would consider whether we would accept these unofficial and confidential assurances, but that I felt we should be able to exercise some check on the carrying out of the promise. I suggested that some arrangement might be made whereby our Control Officers in North Africa could be informed of the location of the cobalt and exercise a degree of supervision in order to make sure that it was not exported. Mr. Guérin felt that it would be possible to come to an agreement on this and suggested that the matter be taken up through our Embassy in Vichy, which would be in a better position to discuss such confidential or off-the-record matters with officials of the Foreign Office.

Mr. Guérin then proposed that instead of a full cargo of kerosene the French should be allowed to purchase a cargo one-half of which would consist of kerosene and the remainder of gas oil, fuel oil and lubricants. I said that negotiations for such a cargo might take a good deal longer than the full tanker load of kerosene which we had proposed and that it would be advisable to postpone discussion of the other petroleum products to a subsequent date.

I said that if we undertook to make further shipments to North Africa we would wish to obtain substantial quantities of olive oil in addition to the 200 tons promised for the vessels now loading at Casablanca. Mr. Guérin replied that he was prepared to offer us substantial quantities of olive oil provided petroleum products could be sent to French West Africa. I observed that in as much as we had previously allowed a French tanker loaded with kerosene to discharge 2,000 tons at Dakar while en route to Casablanca, it [Page 325] might be possible to repeat this arrangement in the present instance. Mr. Guérin said that in such an event more olive oil could be shipped on the next vessels to leave North Africa after the two now loading.

Mr. Guérin said that he wished to stress the urgent need in French North Africa of spare parts for agricultural machinery and petroleum products for agricultural purposes. He said that if we really meant to provide economic assistance to North Africa it was essential that the French be allowed to obtain priority for 2,000 tons of agricultural spare parts on order with American manufacturers. These spare parts together with a supply of petroleum products for the tractors and other agricultural machinery were vitally needed if the economy of North Africa was to be preserved. He said that the Germans were already endeavoring to discuss the question of supplying North Africa with machinery and gasoline which the French would have to accept if no American aid was forthcoming.