Yesterday I had a conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Soong. As
matters involving some political consequences were broached as well as
military ones, I have the feeling that I should give you a memorandum of the
interview. I understand that there is a staff conference this afternoon
which is considering the military intervention of China into Indo-China and
as a result of that conference
[Page 751]
I
think we will be prepared to notify Dr. Soong what, if any, attitude from a
military point of view we would have toward such a step.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)
Washington, January 10,
1942.
Dr. T. V. Soong called and delivered me a communication which he had
received from Dr. Chen, the China Defense Supply representative in
Rangoon. The substance of this communication related to the clearing up
of the Lend-Lease supply situation in Rangoon, and a suggestion that
Colonel Twitty of the American forces there, who has since been
relieved, was particularly bitter against the Chinese and was
threatening the dissemination of information hostile to the Chinese. I
passed this communication on to General Marshall.4
Dr. Soong also referred to a conversation which he had had with the
French Ambassador, Henry-Haye. The French Ambassador indicated that he
had heard a rumor to the effect that the Chinese might enter Indo China
as a result of the permission granted by the French to the Japanese
troops to do so. Henry-Haye stated that Dr. Soong must realize how
deplorable any such entry would be from the point of view of
French-Chinese relations; that the permission given to the Japanese had
been given only as a matter of necessity and that China must not
misunderstand it; that it did not offer any satisfactory excuse for the
entry of their troops. Dr. Soong reported to me that he had stated in
effect that this was an entirely unilateral affair, that the Japanese
had been using Indo-Chinese bases for attacks on Chinese territory, and
that France could not consider that she was really neutral in this
respect; that if even as a matter of necessity the French felt obliged
to give access to the Japanese troops, they could not object if as a
matter of necessity China felt compelled to protect herself from the
action which had been thus induced. Dr. Soong asked specifically whether
from a military point of view there was any objection on our part to
such a movement by Chinese troops and to what extent it fitted into the
unified plan of the Far East. I told Dr. Soong that I would talk to
General Marshall about this and let him know. I also advised him that in
my judgment he should also communicate with the State Department and
advise them of his conversations with Henry-Haye, and that as the
question that he posed had political implications as well as military,
he should also take up that matter with the State Department.
[Page 752]
Dr. Soong also told me that he had heard from the Chinese representative
in Stockholm (I am not sure whether this was the Military Attaché or the
Ambassador or some other representative, but I got the impression that
it was a rather authoritative source) to the effect that the Germans had
been demanding passage for troops through Sweden to Finland. The Swedes
had refused thus far and Hitler5 was
beginning to use some rather ugly terms. As a result, some Swedish
troops were being moved into prepared positions and it looked as if the
refusal might continue. According to the reports, the Swedes were well
supplied with anti-aircraft, artillery, and small arms, and the only
thing that they needed was aircraft; and if aircraft were furnished,
they were quite sure that Sweden would continue its refusal and would
very likely fight the Germans in a very determined fashion if they
attempted to force passage.
I notified General Marshall of all the information that Dr. Soong had
given me and also carried to him the renewed request of Dr. Soong for
the appointment of a senior Army officer to go to Chungking.
