I regard this draft as a rough outline and a not complete setting forth
of our position. The Japanese draftsmen have had months in which to
prepare their draft. I have had only a few hours in which to dictate
this possible “counter-draft”.
I feel that it is not necessary to present any draft to the Japanese in
the immediate future, that is, before Mr. Matsuoka is well on his way
toward Japan.
If and when a draft is presented to the Japanese, it would be well, in my
opinion, for us to include in such draft less than we would be willing
to agree to, that is, less than appears in my draft now under reference.
The Japanese have put into their draft a good deal more than they expect
to agree to. We, if we give them a draft, should put ourselves in a
position for bargaining.
My view of the problem which now confronts us is substantially this:
Nothing that might be agreed upon between the American and the Japanese
Governments within the next few days or weeks will substantially alter
the world situation in its material aspects; a negotiation between Japan
and the United States might have some effect as regards deliberation and
discussion between and among the various Japanese factions, but it would
not enable any group not now in control of Japan’s affairs to oust those
who are in control and gain control for itself; the decision of Japanese
leaders whether to move or not to move southward will be made in the
light of the physical situation in Europe as they view it and the
physical situation in the Pacific as they view it; negotiations of any
sort between would-be aggressors and persons or groups who wish to
exercise a restraining influence are of greater advantage to the former
than to the latter, by virtue of the fact that in the process of a
negotiation the would-be aggressor gains information regarding what is
or is not in the hands and in the minds of those whom he is seeking to
outwit or to defeat; it is utterly desirable that, in our relations and
our contacts with the Japanese at this time, we should avoid giving any
indication of other than a firm attitude and firm intention on our part,
we should do all that we can toward giving them an impression that we
are both prepared
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and
expecting to oppose by force any further moves southward if attempted by
them.
Reference is respectfully made to the text of a telegram which we sent to
London a few days ago.
It is believed desirable and it is suggested that, if and before we enter
upon anything approximating a negotiation with the Japanese, we inform
the British Government of the problem which confronts us and our
intention in regard thereto.
[Annex]
[Washington,] April 11,
1941.
In regard to the John Doe associates
Reference, draft left with the Secretary by D91 on April 9, 1941.92
A tentative outline of a possible counter-proposal indicative of what
the United States might advisedly agree to. [This is based on and
follows the set-up, as to form, of the draft submitted by D.]93
I. Concepts of the United States
and of Japan regarding international relations and the character
of nations.
Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed
toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a
new era of reciprocal respect for rights and obligations, reciprocal
confidence, and cooperation on the part of and among all
peoples.
Both Governments declare that it is their concept and conviction that
nations and races are all members of a world family; that each
should enjoy rights and admit and accept and fulfill obligations
with a community of objectives and purposes regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of moral and physical welfare,
individual and collective, which it is their right and duty to
defend for themselves and not to destroy for others.
Both Governments expect and intend to be guided by these concepts and
principles.
II. The attitudes of the United
States and of Japan toward the European war.
The Government of Japan declares that the purpose of its Axis
Alliance was and is defensive and is designed to prevent extension
of military grouping among nations not already engaged in the
European hostilities, and94 [The Government of Japan]95 declares that its
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military obligation under the Axis Alliance
comes into force only if and when one of the parties of the alliance
is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the
European hostilities.
The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward
the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined
solely and exclusively by considerations of its national security
and the defense thereof.
III. China affairs.
When this agreement is concluded and both Governments have committed
themselves to its provisions, the President of the United States
will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of China
that those Governments enter into a negotiation for a termination of
hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations on a basis as
follows:
-
a.
- The independence and sovereignty of China to be
respected.
-
b.
- Japanese troops to be withdrawn from Chinese territory in
accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon.
-
c.
- No cession, leasing or military occupation of Chinese
territory.
-
d.
- No imposition of indemnities.
-
e.
- Resumption of the “open door” on a basis of equality of
opportunity in terms of and with conditions of fair
treatment for all concerned.96
-
f.
- No large-scale or concentrated emigration of Japanese into
Chinese territory.
With the acceptance by the Japanese and the Chinese
Governments of this suggestion, the two Governments shall be
expected to begin direct negotiations.
The negotiations shall be conducted on a basis of legal equality and
with resort to no form of duress.
[Up to such time as the Japanese and the Chinese Governments shall
have accepted this proposal, the United States will expect to
conduct its relations with both of those countries in accordance
with its own estimate of the requirements of its national security
and self-defense.]97
IV. Naval, aerial, and mercantile
marine relations in the Pacific.
-
a.
- Both Governments declare and they pledge to each other that
their naval and aerial forces are not to be used for any purpose
of disturbing or altering the status quo
in the Pacific.
-
b.
- The Japanese Government will, if desired, use its good offices
toward release for contract by Americans of a percentage which
may be practicable of Japan’s total tonnage of merchant vessels
as soon as such vessels can be released from their present
commitments.
[Page 145]
V. Commerce and financial
cooperation.
The two Governments agree that each shall permit export to the other
of commodities in amounts up to the figures of pre-war trade,
except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own
purposes of security and self-defense. The two Governments shall as
soon as world conditions warrant conclude a new treaty of navigation
and commerce.
As soon as a treaty of peace shall have been concluded between Japan
and China, the United States will sympathetically consider, if
presented, requests from Japanese and Chinese sources approved by
their respective Governments, for gold credits for the purpose of
fostering constructive enterprises, industrial developments and
trade directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions
and to sustained economic cooperation among the countries of the
Pacific.
VI. Economic activity in the
southwestern Pacific area.
On the basis of a pledge by the Japanese Government that Japanese
activities in relations with other countries in the Pacific shall be
carried on by peaceful means and without resort to arms, the
American Government will cooperate with the Japanese Government
toward and will give support to Japanese efforts toward production
and procurement of supplies of raw materials, et cetera, which Japan
needs.
VII. Policies of the two nations
affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
-
a.
- The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not
assent to future transfers of territory for relegation of
existing states within the Far East and in the southwestern
Pacific area under conditions of duress to any power.
-
b.
- The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly
guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will
cooperate toward preventing any aggression against those
islands.
-
c.
- The Government of the United States would be willing to
discuss with the Japanese and the British Governments a project
for an agreement that no territorial possessions of any of the
three powers shall be used as a base for aggression or offensive
military action against any power or area in the Pacific or the
Far East.
-
d.
- The Government of the United States will use its influence
toward causing amicable consideration to be given to desiderata
which may be put forward by the Japanese Government on the
subject of migration of nationals on a basis of equality,
freedom from discrimination, and reciprocity.
Conference.
It is suggested that a conference between delegates of the powers
principally interested in the Pacific be held at Honolulu at the
earliest
[Page 146]
possible moment
for consideration of the problem of maintaining peace and
safeguarding the interests of all concerned in the Pacific and the
Far East.
