Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/200513/14

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine⁶⁰

[Washington,] March 28, 1941.

On March 24, on the morning following my arrival in New York, I telephoned Father Drought and arranged to see him that morning. He gave me an extended account of the background in regard to the business on which I had come to see him. He explained that Bishop Walsh and he had gone to Japan last November for the purpose of discussing with the Japanese authorities questions presented by the adverse effects of the recent Japanese religious legislation upon the educational work of the Catholic Church in Japan. It was in the course of these discussions that the subject of American-Japanese relations arose. Soon after their arrival they were invited to talk with Matsuoka, who expressed concern for Japanese-American relations. Bishop Walsh expressed himself forthrightly to Matsuoka in regard to Japan’s misguided policies. Matsuoka indicated that he was sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and he declared that if he could only see the President for an hour he felt sure that he could bring about an improvement in those relations. Matsuoka asked the churchmen to convey a message to the President in regard to his desire for good relations with the United States. Subsequently the churchmen were invited to meet numerous Japanese leaders outside the Foreign Office group. Their principal contact was through Wikawa, head of the Cooperative Bank, who appeared to have close relations with persons in the higher political circles, both civilian and military, and who put the churchmen into direct contact with many of these leaders. During the course of the conferences thus held most of the points covered in the “draft” which Father Drought later communicated to the Department were discussed. The points not discussed were those covered by the following paragraphs: Preamble, paragraph 2; Rules for Nations, paragraph 1, paragraph 2, subparagraphs III, IV, and VI; Axis Alliance, the entire section; Intermediation of China–Japan Conflict (this was elaborated here); Proposed Secret Terms for Settlement of the China–Japan Conflict, paragraph 3; Naval Forces, the entire section; Japanese Trade Relations with Germany, A; Status of Far Eastern States under Joint Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine, the joint feature of the plan.

The churchmen left Japan on December 28 and arrived in the United States in the middle of January. Shortly thereafter they communicated Matsuoka’s message to the President. About that time Suma⁶¹ arrived in New York en route to Spain, and the churchmen asked him how they might communicate a message to Matsuoka. Suma (after referring the matter to Tokyo) replied to them to communicate through Iguchi (the Japanese Consul at New York). Pursuant to this reply they communicated a statement to the effect that the message^61a had been delivered. Both Suma and Iguchi endeavored to question Father Drought about the matter, but he told them nothing. Father Drought then conveyed a similar message to Wikawa. Shortly afterwards he received a message from Wikawa that he was proceeding to the United States. He arrived on February 25, since which date he and Father Drought occupied themselves in preparing the draft.

Although Wikawa and Iwakuro were expected to arrive in New York on Monday⁶² evening, Father Drought informed me later⁶³ by telephone that he had received a telephone communication from San Francisco that Iwakuro had been taken ill on the boat and that they were consequently proceeding to New York by train rather than by air. At Father Drought’s suggestion Wikawa proceeded alone by air, but he did not arrive until late Wednesday night, owing to the plane’s being held up at Albuquerque by storms.

In my interview with Father Drought on Thursday morning before seeing Wikawa, Father Drought informed me that a hitch had occurred owing to the fact that the German Ambassador at Tokyo⁶⁴ had become apprised of Iwakuro’s departure from Tokyo within a few hours thereafter. As a result the German Government had taken counter measures of a nature which the Japanese had not foreseen. Father Drought would not reveal to me what these measures were, but he said that the situation would necessitate a complete change in plans as far as procedure was concerned. He felt sure, however, that this development would not affect substantially the terms of the “draft”.

After having imparted this information to me, he communicated with Wikawa and took me to Wikawa’s quarters in the same hotel. After introducing us, Father Drought withdrew. I had a conversation of over four hours with Wikawa. He gave me a detailed account of his career and his relations with other Japanese leaders. He said that his career had been largely in the field of finance. He had been adviser to the Japanese expeditionary force to Siberia in 1918–1920,⁶⁵ when he came into close contact with Matsudaira, now Minister of the Imperial Household and one of the most prominent pro-Anglo-American group. Wikawa is a cousin of Wakatsuki,⁶⁶ twice Prime Minister and still influential in circles surrounding the throne, although he is now 76 years old. Wikawa is director of the Cooperative Associations and head of the Cooperative Bank, which is now the largest banking group in Japan, larger even than the Mitsui and Yasuda. In this way Wikawa represents, he told me, 55 percent of the entire population of Japan and 90 percent of the agricultural and fishing populations. The president of the Cooperatives is Count Arima, who was Minister of Agriculture in the first Konoe Cabinet, but who declined a portfolio in the second Konoe Cabinet. Arima has had close connections with Marquess Kido, Lord Privy Seal, and Prince Konoe. These three are the most influential among the civilian leaders. In as much as the army also has its roots in the agrarian population, Count Arima’s relations with the army leaders are close, and Wikawa told me that the army leaders are very anxious to avoid trouble with the United States, but he felt that this was not true among some of the more radical officers of the Japanese navy who feel that they have not had their share of glory during the last three years. He said, however, that during the last few years the navy has been given very generous appropriations which they have employed to expand the navy. He also informed me, and he said that he was incurring the risk of assassination in telling me, that a barter arrangement amounting to two billion yen had been arranged with Germany, but that of this amount only 25 percent had so far been carried out. Wikawa spoke also of his associate, Iwakuro, who was due to arrive on March 30. He said that Iwakuro was the driving force in the army and a prodigious worker and was well thought of among all factions in the army, as well as in civilian circles. He had the complete confidence of General Tojo, the Minister of War, and General Muto, the director of the Military Affairs Bureau. He said that with Colonel Iwakuro there was also arriving a Colonel Shinjo, who was not being accredited to the Embassy, but would have his office in New York. Colonel Shinjo, he said, was an ordnance officer. Wikawa spoke with appreciation of the reception that had been accorded Iwakuro by General Peake at San Francisco.

Wikawa spoke of the scientific thoroughness of German propaganda methods in Japan and he said that Stahmer⁶⁷ had taken advantage of our export restrictions⁶⁸ and of our termination of the commercial treaty to persuade Japanese leaders to join the Axis. He said that the Germans had promised that as soon as Japan joined the Axis, Germany would arrange with the Soviet Union to enter into a political agreement with Japan. In fact, Tatekawa⁶⁹ anticipated before his departure for Moscow that upon his arrival there all he would have to do would be to sign on the dotted line. The failure of the political agreement to materialize had caused considerable disappointment over the Axis alliance. Wikawa said, however, that he was an optimist and that he had plans with which he hoped to counter German influence and he asked me not to divulge anything he was saying to members of the Japanese Embassy. He said that probably the officers of the Embassy would be disappointed that they were not in on negotiations, but he felt that such negotiations should be in the hands of more experienced persons than the Japanese career diplomats. He felt that the Japanese diplomatic service was out of touch with Japanese politics, and he indicated very clearly that he did not have any confidence in them. He spoke of Wakasugi as a man who had been too long away from Japan. Later on Wikawa made an apparently contradictory statement that he thought the best way was for Admiral Nomura to discuss matters directly with Secretary Hull. I endeavored discreetly to draw him out further in regard to his plans, but he would divulge nothing further. On the other hand, he endeavored to draw me out on my opinions, but I confined myself to generalities regarding American traditional policies much in the same manner as we had discussed the subject a few weeks ago with Mr. Hashimoto. Wikawa spoke of Japan’s population problem and asked whether the Secretary was sympathetic with Japan’s desire to send peaceful emigrants to thinly populated regions. I said that I did not recall any opinion having been expressed by the Secretary on that subject.

Comment: Wikawa is about 52 years old. He strikes me as being a person of character, force, and intelligence. I do not quite share Father Drought’s optimism in regard to the immediate readiness of Wikawa and Iwakuro to agree to a plan for the settlement of the Far Eastern situation along the lines indicated in the draft. I think that it will take some time before the Japanese concerned can make adjustments to the new situation, whatever it may be, and that in the meantime they will divulge their ideas and plans only a little at a time in the hope of drawing me out as much as possible to gauge the extent of our eagerness to come to terms with them. Consequently I anticipate that some days must elapse before I will learn fully what they have in mind.

60. The Under Secretary of State (Welles) on April 3 wrote the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): “I have read this memorandum with much interest.”

    Mr. Ballantine was appointed on February 28 as Counselor of Embassy in China but meanwhile continued on special assignment in the Department.

61. Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Minister to Spain, and previously Director of the Bureau of Information and Intelligence, Japanese Foreign Office.
62. In a copy filed in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, the words “to the President” are inserted here.
62. March 24.
63. In a copy filed in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, “later” is crossed out and the words “subsequent to our interview” are inserted after “telephone”.
64. Maj. Gen. Eugen Ott.
65. Marginal notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “‘Bad actors.’”
66. Notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “How does Wakatsuki stand with the Army?”
67. Heinrieh Georg Stahmer, German adviser in Japan during Axis pact negotiations.
68. Marginal notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “We had placed few before then” (1940).
69. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union.