711.94/20057/14
The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State 46
Memo
A preliminary draft of the “agreement in principle” is already drawn in rather extended form. Certain points are so important and critical that they should reach you, in summary form, at once.
Incredible as it may seem, Mr. Wikawa has substantially approved an “agreement in principle” which provides:—
- a.
- diplomatic, political, economic and financial instruments for the dissolution of the German-Japanese partnership and the complete cessation of all trade with Germany:
- b.
- the release of a considerable tonnage of Japanese merchant ships to be chartered to Americans without restriction as to cargo or destination, with the single exception of direct discharge in England or Scotland:
- c.
- a formula by which the United States during the next three years may request the cooperation of Japan’s naval forces:
- d.
- secret terms confided exclusively to the United States for the settlement of the China War and provision for the intermediation of President Roosevelt if such terms meet with his confidential approval:
- e.
- a recommendation for the formation of certain autonomous states in the southwestern Pacific to forestall the pawning or seizure of such states as war spoils:
- f.
- guarantee of Philippine independence and conditional aid in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third power:
- g.
- Japanese pledge against military or political seizure of any territory within the Far Eastern region as defined and stabilized by a joint American–Japanese declaration of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine [Page 96] to be interpreted and applied, after consultation, in a manner exactly parallelling the functioning of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.
- h.
- the inauguration of vast economic opportunity for the United States in the Far East (1) by economic treaty (2) by method of gold credit allocation (but not physical transfer) which would make it impossible for the present Germany to trade in the Far East and, at the same time, render Japan amicably, but so deeply, subservient to the United States that political antagonism would be suicidal:
- i.
- a conference at Honolulu, to be called as soon as practicable, to specify the economics and limitations of the “agreement in principle” and to signalize by appropriate circumstances (notably the attendance of President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye) the inauguration of a new era of Peace in the Pacific (and the end of the Axis Alliance! Alleluia!)
After consultation with Col. Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa asserts that some modification but no substantial change will be made on the above-mentioned points of agreement.
For reasons which cannot be described briefly but which are subtly confirmed in Matsuoka’s statement (March 15th) that “some latent results may be obtained” from his talks with Axis leaders, it is morally certain, though as yet not positively confirmed by private cable, that Mr. Matsuoka is going to Berlin to announce the intention of the American agreement which Prince Konoye considers it most necessary to synchronize with the announcement of the Axis. (Indeed they must be synchronized if assassinations are to be avoided.)
If our negotiations fail, Matsuoka will strengthen, presumably, the Axis at Berlin.
P. S.—This communication is, of course, absolutely confidential to the three persons.47