711.94/2600
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 19, 1942.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams, no. 463 of November 28, 10 a.m., and no. 465 of November 30, 10 a.m., and to enclose copies of memoranda of my conversations on November 27 and 29, with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of American-Japanese discussions at Washington on the problems of the Pacific.58
When the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to call on November 27, I had received no information from the Department on [Page 712] the progress of the American-Japanese discussions later than that contained in the Department’s telegram No. 273 of November 22 [19], 3 p.m. Dr. Quo brought me up to date by translating from a telegram in Chinese received by him from Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, a nine point draft of a proposed modus vivendi which he said had been submitted by the American Government for the information and consideration of the Chinese, British, Australian and Netherlands diplomatic representatives at Washington.
As detailed in the enclosed memorandum of my conversation, Dr. Quo then proceeded to stress the “apprehension; indeed resentment” which had been aroused by the proposed modus vivendi, emphasizing that it might have an “irreparable” effect on the Chinese public attitude and seriously threaten Chinese morale and the will to continue resistance. While asserting his confidence in the American Government and his own understanding of the situation which might suggest a delaying action for three months, Dr. Quo directed his attention principally to point seven of the proposed modus vivendi, which, he asserted, failed to conform the American position to the principles of the Nine Power Pact or the American declaration of principles of 1937. Apparently the Chinese Ambassador at Washington in reporting point seven used the Chinese characters which were translated as “desiring” but which I understand might be more accurately translated as “expecting”. Point seven was rendered in English substantially as follows: “With reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict, the United States only desires to see a settlement based on law, order, peace, and justice.”
The Department’s telegram no. 277 of November 28, 7 p.m.,59 outlining the draft of the proposed modus vivendi does not mention any such provision as that described to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as “point seven”.
The official Chinese reaction to the proposed modus vivendi between the United States and Japan is not surprising to the Embassy. The Chinese have wished for the complete failure of the Japanese-American conversations and the early entry of the United States into war with Japan. The Chinese believe that no lasting peace can be had in the Far East until Japan is first crushed by armed force. As I reported when Consul General at Shanghai, shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict at that port in 1937, Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression is largely based on the Chinese expectation that sooner or later Japan will clash with other powers having interests in the Far East and in the resulting armed conflict China will be saved from Japan.
That hope or expectation continues to inspire Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who is the source and strength of the spirit of resistance in [Page 713] China—resistance against compromise as well as against the armed aggression of Japan.
I believe that I am not overstating in saying that the Chinese attitude is almost one of resentment that the American-Japanese conversations in Washington were opened and patiently continued. Dr. Quo Tai-chi in saying to me that the proposed modus vivendi had caused “apprehension; indeed resentment”, for the moment apparently did not bear in mind that information regarding the proposal had reached only the highest Chinese government circles. His statement in my opinion undoubtedly reflects the attitude of Generalissimo Chiang, and the latter’s wife whose unrestrainedly critical attitude toward the United States and our failure precipitately to plunge our country into war with Japan has undoubtedly influenced the Generalissimo. The alarm and apprehension felt by the Generalissimo is undoubtedly reflected in his action in seeking to influence official American opinion through other than the regular diplomatic channels.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to me, from my conversations with him, to take a calmer and broader view, reflecting a more intelligent understanding of international affairs; but his official attitude is undoubtedly directed and controlled by the Generalissimo upon whom he has not yet come to exercise any outstanding influence.
Respectfully yours,