711.94/2087: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 28—10 a.m.]
463. I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening at his request. He asked me whether I was informed with regard to the course of the discussions in Washington. I replied that I was informed of the Secretary’s remarks to Dr. Hu Shih on November 18. He commented that matters had moved along quite far since then and proceeded to translate to me from a telegram in Chinese received from Dr. Hu nine points of a proposed arrangement between the United States and Japan providing for a 3 months’ modus vivendi which had been discussed by the Secretary with the representatives of the other ABCD powers. He said that General Chiang and he had instructed Dr. Hu to represent to our Government that China’s attitude toward the arrangement was “negative”; that Dr. Hu had done this on November 25 and that he had at that time been assured that the United States Government had no intention of sacrificing China’s interests and the Chinese had been requested to impose implicit confidence in the intentions of the administration in this regard.
Dr. Quo then spoke frankly and forcefully of what he and General Chiang considered would be the psychological effects of the modus vivendi on the Chinese public and the Chinese will to continue resistance. He said that the proposals had occasioned not only apprehension but resentment (presumably in high official circles since they are not known elsewhere at this time).
He recalled that China had undergone over four years of war; admitted that at present the economic and military strain is great; and expressed fear that the breaking point might be near. He doubted that Chinese morale would withstand the shock of a Japanese-American modus vivendi such as reported. He referred to the feeling aroused last year by the closing of the Burma Road and said that official and popular Chinese reaction to the modus vivendi would be [Page 681] much more severe because China placed great confidence and hope in the United States and the feeling of being “let down” would be correspondingly bitter. He was particularly concerned over point 7 contrasting the wording thereof with past statements of principle in the nine power treaties and in our 1937 declaration of American foreign policy.15
Dr. Quo repeatedly stressed the seriousness of the situation from the standpoint of potential Chinese reaction and stated that the “damage” caused by a modus vivendi might be “irreparable”. He commented that the Japanese in their radio broadcasts from occupied territory are already inferring that America is prepared to appease Japan at China’s expense, and he added confidentially that the Chinese Government is already aware that the Japanese are again bringing pressure on General Yen Hsi Shan whose loyalty has been suspected.
I told Dr. Quo that I had endeavored to keep Washington faithfully informed on reactions here and that I would not fail to report our conversations.
As this telegram is being encoded, I have just received the Department’s 274, November 27 [26], 9 p.m.,16 which leads me to believe that Chinese apprehension here is not well founded, if as I infer from the message the modus vivendi discussed with Dr. Hu was of Japanese origin.
- July 16, 1937, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 325.↩
- Not printed; it reported the oral statement and draft proposal of November 26, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 766 and 768.↩