711.94/2512
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Problem of Far Eastern Relations—Estimate of Situation and Certain Probabilities
The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.
Mr. Kurusu’s mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.
The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making “concessions” to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, of aggression on Japan’s part.
Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.
The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the “exploratory conversations”, clear evidence that it is not that Government’s intention at the present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in the Far East, and establishing a “new order” and a “co-prosperity sphere” in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of force or use of force—which means continuance of contribution to instability rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.
The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side in the event of Japan’s taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.
The business of prophesying involves a procedure of examining facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.
[Page 673]A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to happen.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward “bringing China to her knees”. They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make “war” on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before December 15 (the date by which General Gerow has affirmed that we would be “in the clear” so far as consummation of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before the 15th of January (i. e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have “time” for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of “war” must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic: the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized “state of war” such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for “defensive” and general purposes. Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of “war” in the Pacific.
[Page 674]Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch some new operations in and against China. But, a move against Russia would be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan; and it would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.
A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand an exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the “China incident”. A move on Japan’s part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan’s military leaders.
The reasonable probability is that Japan’s new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.
If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.
There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of “concessions” by us in return for “pledges” (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one [Page 675] of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.
The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.