711.94/2507

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 8

Referring to the call which Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu are to make on you this afternoon at 2:30,9 it is suggested that you may care to include in your comments mention of the following points:

(1)
We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued [Page 671] to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.
(2)
We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan’s courses of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.
(3)
We remain convinced that Japan’s own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan’s own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

  1. Drafted by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck).
  2. For memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 770.