711.94/2560
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request.
[Page 667]The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which had so recently been under discussion.
I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated questions by the British Government in regard thereto.
Lord Halifax said he could not understand this in as much as he had communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British Government.
To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the President yesterday could hardly be regarded as “full support,” but on the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.
Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese morale.
I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was evident from the information received here that the Japanese were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated.