711.94/2477
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of
State
[Washington,] November 25, 1941.
The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum,
a copy of which is hereto attached. I commented briefly on the
impossibility of not letting the Japanese have some oil for strictly
civilian use, if we, in turn, are to secure the tremendously valuable
commitment by the Japanese not to move on any aggressive course outside
of China proper during the next three months. I pointed out to the
Ambassador the advantages to China with respect to the Burma Road and
its possible destruction and the removal of any menace to the South Sea
area which would be of great interest
[Page 655]
and advantage to Great Britain, Australia, the
Netherlands East Indies and the United States as well.
I emphasized that this proposed modus vivendi was
really a part of what the Japanese claimed to be a continuance of the
same conversations held heretofore relative to a permanent agreement on
a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out
the utter impracticability of requesting a suspension of further
military advances in China in addition to the preceding assurances.
The Ambassador referred to the provision in the proposed draft of a modus vivendi limiting the Japanese troops in
Indochina to 25,000 and urged that that number be reduced in our draft.
I said that we would do the best we could in the matter, that our Army
and Navy experts feel that 25,000 in North Indochina would not be a
menace to the Burma Road, and that even double that number would not be
a serious menace.
[Annex]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
88
Japanese proposal is clearly unacceptable and the only question
appears to be whether:—
- (a)
- To reject it and (while making it clear that a limited
agreement is not ruled out) to leave it to the Japanese to
produce a better offer, or
- (b)
- to make a counter proposal.
We have complete confidence in Mr. Hull’s handling of these
negotiations and he is in the best position to judge which of these
two courses is the better tactics. We feel sure that he fully
understands that the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision
by magnifying the dangers of delay. If having taken this into
account he feels it best to put forward a counter proposal we will
support this course.
The Japanese proposal should, we feel, be regarded as the opening
movement in a process of bargaining. It puts their own desiderata at
a maximum and the price at a minimum. If a counter proposal is to be
made we suggest that this process should be reversed and that our
demands should be pitched high and our price low.
The removal of merely “the bulk” of Japanese troops from Indo China
would allow too wide a loophole. It is doubtful whether we should be
justified in accepting this as satisfactory and still less in
suggesting
[Page 656]
it. Apart from
the desirability of pitching a counter proposal higher than we may
obtain, it seems advisable from the Chinese angle so to frame it as
to frustrate the possibility of any attack on Kunming during the
currency of an interim agreement.
On this basis we would suggest for the consideration of the United
States Government that any counter proposal should stipulate for the
total withdrawal from Indo China not merely of the Japanese “troops”
as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval, military and air
forces with their equipment and for the suspension
of further military advances in China in addition to
satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia,
the Southern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro
quo being legitimate relaxation of existing economic
measures so as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to
ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but
excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in
particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage
except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only
become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces
took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a
similar nature from Japan if we required them.
Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that
any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement
which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the
United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it
will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely
provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an
ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all
parties concerned.
The above represents our immediate reaction, sent without
consultation with the Dominion Governments who as in the case of the
Netherlands and the Chinese Governments may have other
suggestions.
There remains the question raised as to the degree of authority to be
delegated to the representatives of the powers concerned in
Washington. We are of course anxious to facilitate Mr. Hull’s
difficult task in all possible ways. But our economic structure is
so complicated (in particular by the necessity of consultation with
other parts of the Empire) that we do not think it practicable at
this stage to give carte blanche to diplomatic representatives. If
the United States Government favour the suggestion which we made
above, it will be necessary to define more closely the distinction
between goods of importance to the welfare of the Japanese civilian
population and those of direct importance to Japan’s war potential,
and to consider whether relaxation of economic pressure should be
operated by financial control or by barter. After this stage we
would be prepared to consider the question of discretion afresh.
