Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/16460: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, November 7, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received November 8—2:55 a.m.]

441. Reference Department’s no. 253, November 3, 11 p.m. The reports referred to reflect the uncertainty and the division and revision of opinion prevailing in official circles, here, are [and?] I have no doubt elsewhere, regarding the problem of anticipating future Japanese military moves.

I doubt whether the Japanese themselves could now say when or where or in what direction they will eventually move, if at all.

Magruder is absent in Burma.⁸⁶ The Military and Naval Attachés and I do not feel that we have sufficiently dependable information at this isolated post to warrant an estimate “as to which and how many of these anticipated attacks the Japanese may be about to make”. After consultation, I offer the following comment:

1. The Japanese are obviously prepared for an attack on Siberia but whether and when they make such an attack would seem to depend largely on political developments in eastern Europe and on political and other considerations. Russian opinion here is to the effect that as the season of cold weather advances a large scale attack by the Japanese on Siberia becomes less likely but they might attempt an attack on the Maritime Provinces. I am of the opinion that Japan will endeavor to obtain concessions from Russia, believing that Russia does not desire a clash with Japan on the eastern front and may therefore be willing to come to terms.

2. The Japanese forces now in Indochina are not believed to be sufficiently strong to permit an immediate attack in any direction, but according to reports they are daily being strengthened. Their immediate purpose may be to reform their position in Indochina while operating elsewhere. It is possible however that they are preparing for an attack on Thailand or on Yunnan and possibly an attack on Burma. An attack on Thailand might possibly, and an attack on Burma would certainly, involve Japan in a conflict with Great Britain and perhaps others.

An attack on Yunnan is considered by the Chinese as the logical objective of the Japanese concentration in Indochina. Such a move is less likely to involve Japan with other powers and it would have as its important objective the gutting [cutting?] of the Burma Road and China’s line of supply. Such an expedition would be difficult and probably costly but it is considered to be feasible, especially with air support. The expedition must operate during the dry season from November to March. Therefore if it is to be undertaken, it should be started in the very near future.

It is regarded as certain that whether or not the Japs embark upon a land expedition into Yunnan to cut the Burma [Road—] and it can be cut effectively only by such a measure [—] the Japanese will establish and maintain a strong air concentration in Northern Indochina to attack the Burma Road and to attack the American volunteer or any other air force entering Yunnan for the protection of the Road. There is not at the moment a heavy Japanese air force concentration in Northern Indochina but it is our understanding that air fields in that area are now being completed and a substantial air force could then reach fields rapidly from outside points.

Gauss

86. For concurrence by General Magruder with views expressed in this telegram, see telegram No. 460, November 25, 11 a.m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. v, p. 764.