711.94/2406
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
The reasoning in this telegram,81 as in many which have preceded it, runs to the general effect that, although Japan misbehaves, we must [Page 569] not apply strong pressures to Japan—because that would probably cause Japan to do things which would bring on war, in which case the fault would be ours; rather, we must conciliate Japan, by making concessions; but, in doing this, we must not recede one inch from our fundamental principles. Mr. Grew says: “It is equally far from my intention for a single moment to advocate so-called ‘appeasement’ on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it has laid down as a basis for the adjustment and conduct of international relations including our relations with Japan. Methods may be flexible but with principles there should be no compliance [compromise].”
Query (again): Might it not be appropriate for us to ask the Tokyo Embassy to give us its concept of what might be the provisions of a “settlement” between the United States and Japan—in harmony with and applying the above.
- No. 1736, November 3, 1941, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 701.↩