711.94/11–441
Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Wakasugi presented a keen analysis of the situation on which he reported to his government.76
I feel moved to call attention especially to his expression of the opinion that the United States is willing to make a settlement only if the conditions are acceptable to it; to his expression of doubt whether the United States will make any concessions from the position which it took in the documents of June 21 and October 2;77 his expression of opinion that the United States is not so anxious to enter into an agreement as to be willing to sacrifice any of her “terms”; his belief that Japan should not expect any further counter proposals from us; his opinion that if the Japanese insist upon their freedom of action they must have their minds made up that the negotiations will be terminated and relations be severed; and his recommendation that the new Cabinet lay Japan’s cards on the table.
From the telegrams from Tokyo to Washington, I deduce that the Japanese Foreign Minister is deliberately somewhat overemphasizing the gravity of the situation in Japan for psychological effect upon us and the British.
- For memorandum of the Japanese Minister’s conversations with the Secretary of State October 16 and 17, in which he promised to report to his Government the American position, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 687. For Mr. Wakasugi’s analysis, see intercepted telegram No. 1008, October 29, printed in Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12, p. 86.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 485, 486, and 656.↩