711.94/2459
Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
The underlying letter from Mr. C. A. Evans encloses a number of papers prepared by Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, Peiping, China.69
The second enclosure entitled “The Real Danger in the Pacific” is a particularly penetrating and significant contribution. It is suggested that you read it in its entirety. Interesting passages in this and the other enclosures have been underlined.
Dr. Stuart maintains that “there never has been any serious threat of war between Japan and the United States …70 but the fear of this has kept American policies wavering and cautious, thus serving Japanese ends. Their propaganda has exploited this timid reluctance with no slight skill and there undoubtedly has been—as there still is—a large amount of national pride in Japan which might conceivably take a desperate course regardless of consequences. This supplies the element of reality without which all their blustering would have but little force.”
In Dr. Stuart’s opinion the Japanese, having failed to conquer China by force, through puppets, or through their alliance with the Axis, have only one remaining hope: that the United States “can be dissuaded from interfering with their designs, in which case they might effect a compromise settlement with China and wait again for the opportune time to strike southward or into Siberia.” Dr. Stuart [Page 565] feels that this procrastination will not only redound to Japan’s advantage but will also keep large British, American and Russian forces immobilized in eastern Asia, which forces could be used to great advantage elsewhere.
Dr. Stuart recommends that the American Government—and in such a move he points out it would have the overwhelming support of the American people—demand that Japan make a definite decision without further hesitation whether Japan will abandon its course of aggression. He believes that almost certainly the Japanese decision would be against any hostile action; that such a decision would be a relief to many Japanese; that it would end the “long-continued agonies of the Chinese people and free them for internal reconstruction efforts, from which the whole Pacific area will benefit”; that this solution would release the resources of the democracies for their more difficult task; and that even in the improbable event that this American demand provoked war, the hostilities would thus be revealed as inevitable and something to be disposed of while conditions were comparatively disadvantageous to Japan.
In concluding Dr. Stuart observes that the danger in the present Washington conversations and in further diplomatic measures is not that they might lead to war but rather that they will lead to a “peace” which will be illusory and deceptive.
- None printed. In transmitting a digest of these papers to the Under Secretary of State on November 17, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) wrote: “Dr. Stuart has, as you know, very good Chinese and Japanese contacts. He has resided during practically the whole of his life up to date in China, where his father and his mother before him were missionaries.” A section of the digest, underlined by Dr. Hornbeck in red pencil, stated: “However, ‘on one point all Japanese seem to be agreed—that the China War must be ended as soon as possible.’ He feels, however, that the Japanese are not yet ready to end this war on terms acceptable to China and the United States.”↩
- Omission indicated in the original.↩