Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/2262: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

Washington, September 9, 1941—11 a.m.

573. For the Ambassador and the Counselor only. Your 1405, September 5, 10 p.m., and 1413, September 6, 10 p.m.³ The Japanese Ambassador delivered to me on September 6 the proposals⁴ communicated in your 1384, September 4, 9 p.m.⁵ and we are studying these proposals.

The assurances of the Japanese Prime Minister that the Japanese Government fully subscribes to the four points which I enumerated as a basis for a reconstruction of Japanese-American relations are very gratifying as are also the manifestations of his earnest desire to achieve success in his present efforts.

With reference to the observations contained in numbered paragraph 4 of your 1413, our doubts do not relate to the question whether the Konoe Cabinet can carry out the terms of an agreement based upon the proposals which it has made to us but to the question whether the Konoe Cabinet can agree to and carry out the terms of an agreement consistent with the principles and procedures which we have suggested: terms which would be fair and just to China, duly considerate of the rights and interests of all powers concerned in the Far East, and substantially contributory toward creation and maintenance of peace with stability, order, and justice. The present hostilities between China and Japan constitute a fundamental factor in the problem of a general Pacific settlement, and consequently, the reaching of an equitable adjustment by China and Japan of their difficulties is essential to any general settlement of Pacific problems which could be expected to ensure future peace and stability in that area. The original Japanese proposal called for the exercise of good offices by the President, and we told the Japanese that we could not approach the Chinese Government with a suggestion that it enter into negotiations with Japan unless we were informed of the basic terms which Japan proposed to offer and unless we were satisfied that these terms were in harmony with the principles to which this Government was committed. We reached an impasse in our discussion of these terms because of the insistence of the Japanese upon stationing troops for an indefinite period in Inner Mongolia and North China and because we were unable to obtain explicit commitments in regard to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to Japan’s proposed program of economic cooperation with China. We have contended throughout for an agreement the objective and the provisions of which shall relate to comprehensive peace in the Pacific and Eastern Asia.

The latest Japanese proposals apparently seek to bridge the impasse not by meeting us on these points but by undertaking that Japan shall deal with China directly on the assumption that, as our good offices are not to be invoked, we would not be concerned with the nature of the peace terms which Japan proposes to offer to China or with developments in the conflict between those two countries. Such an assumption overlooks or disregards our intention, which we have repeatedly made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, before we undertake to enter into any definitive negotiations with Japan relating to a settlement covering the Pacific area, to consult with the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, et cetera. This is because we regard the peace of the Pacific not as a matter to be disposed of by Japan and the United States but as a matter in which the other interested powers have a rightful concern and inevitable responsibilities. Nor would this Government enter into any agreement restricting the measure of assistance that this Government is now according or in future may wish to accord countries which are resisting aggression. It may be assumed that the Chinese Government no less than the Japanese Government is desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement of its difficulties with Japan and that consequently if the Japanese Government is prepared to offer the Chinese Government fair and just terms the two countries would be able to resolve their difficulties. In such a case, there would appear to be no need for a provision such as that contained in item A of the proposed commitments on the part of the United States.

In view of the foregoing considerations, it is obvious that a solution of the difficulties above-mentioned must await some further initiative on the part of the Japanese Government. You may in your discretion discuss the foregoing points with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. It occurs to us also that it might be helpful if you could obtain answers to certain preliminary questions which suggest themselves. Those answers might serve to throw further light upon the intent of the Japanese Government. Among these questions are:

1. In Item “A”, Japanese provisional commitments, Japan indicates its readiness to concur in the points already tentatively agreed upon in preliminary informal conversation with Washington. Does this mean points on which the formulae appearing in our draft of June 21⁶ are identical to those in the draft which the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State on September 4⁷ or in some previous draft?

2. Is it to be understood that the peace terms to be offered to China by Japan will conform to the several points in the annex to Section III of the Japanese draft of September 4⁸ above referred to?

If the answer to question 1 above is in the affirmative, it would appear that the provisions of a number of the stipulations in the Japanese proposals contained in your 1384 are more restrictive than are the commitments called for in the formulae previously tentatively agreed upon. For example, in Item “F” Japan commits itself to observe the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce in the region of the southwest Pacific. Does this mean that Japan does not bind itself similarly in respect to its economic activities elsewhere, especially China? In relation to this general question it is believed that further clarification is desirable of what is meant by the provisions of Item “E” in regard to the economic activities of the United States in China. That is to say, what is meant by an “equitable basis” and whether it is implied or rightly to be inferred that Japan is to be the judge of what constitutes an equitable basis?

In taking up these questions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs you should indicate that other questions may arise in our minds in the course of our further study.

With regard to the formula contained in Item C having to do with the attitude of the United States and of Japan to the war in Europe, although we feel that the formula does not satisfactorily meet the situation—it seems to leave Japan free to interpret any commitment “independently”—we should like to give the matter further study before offering any suggestions.

While the Department perceives no objections to your carrying on conversations paralleling those here with a view to obtaining further elucidation of the intent of the Japanese Government, it is felt that, as the subject is a matter in which the President has a close and active interest, any definitive discussions concerned with the reaching of an agreement on principle should continue to be conducted here.

Hull

3. Neither printed, but see memoranda by the Ambassador in Japan, September 5 and 6, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 600 and 604.
4. Ibid., p. 608.
5. Not printed, but see Ambassador Grew’s comment, ibid., p. 594.
6. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 486.
7. Ibid., p. 597.
8. Ibid., p. 599.