740.0011 P. W./330: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 26—4:05 p.m.]
1097. Embassy’s 1089, July 26, 3 a.m.58
[Here follows account of discussion between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the situation arising out of Japan’s occupation of bases in southern Indochina and the “reported” freezing of Japanese assets in the United States; see memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, July 26, 1941, printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, volume II, page 532. For freezing of assets, see ibid., pages 266 ff.]
3. I have been asked by several friends here why, if Admiral Toyoda foresaw what was about to happen in Indochina and the resulting whirlwind that he would reap, did he accept office? My impression for what it may be worth is that the Japanese, including the Foreign Minister, have always discounted the possibility of serious retaliation by the United States and that our retaliation has now taken them completely by surprise. Whether this is due to inadequate comprehension of American public opinion by Japanese officials in the United States, or whether their reports have failed to convince the Japanese Government, I cannot say. I myself have constantly tried my best to enlighten them. But of one thing I am sure: the astonishment and profound concern of the Japanese at the turn of events are unmistakably genuine, as is the bitter resentment engendered by the action of the United States.
- Not printed.↩