Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/2178

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State ⁷

undated

Memorandum of Comment on Japanese Suggestions of July 11⁸

Preamble.

With reference to the suggested insertion in the first paragraph of the phrase “as equally sovereign States and contiguous Pacific powers”, no reason is given by the Japanese Ambassador for this suggestion. In our opinion, reference in this way to a self-evident fact is likely to be misunderstood as implying a self-asserted predominance of the United States and Japan in the Pacific area.

II. The Attitudes of Both Governments Toward the European War.

For comment on the new draft exchange of letters designed to supplement this section reference is made to the part of the memorandum commenting on the “oral memo”.

III. Action Toward a Peaceful Settlement Between Japan and China.

While we continue to believe that the phraseology of this section as proposed in our draft of June 21⁹ is in keeping with the spirit of the understanding under consideration, and while we do not perceive the reasons for the Japanese objections thereto, we suggest that discussion of the phraseology of the draft presented to us on July 11 might well be postponed until a mutually satisfactory wording is arrived at in respect to the Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of Japan.

V. Economic Activity of Both Nations in the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Ambassador does not give his reasons for desiring the insertion in this paragraph of the phrase “for the production and procurement”. The phraseology adopted in our draft of June 21 was designed to conform to the existing commercial policies of the United States. The inclusion of the suggested phrase might, depending on what the Japanese Government has in mind in desiring the inclusion of that phrase, involve the question of commitments on the part of this Government beyond its established commercial policy, and thus give rise to serious difficulties.

Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of Japan

There are several important changes and omissions in this new draft. For detailed comment on Items 2, 3 and 6 of the “Basic Terms” please refer to comments on the “oral memo”. It may be noted that the phraseology of Item 3 in this new draft does not contain even as broad a commitment on the part of Japan as that already given in Section V of the understanding wherein Japan pledges that its activity in the Pacific area will be carried on in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The Japanese formula proposed for Item 3 of this section does not prohibit partial monopolies, economic advantages or special privileges to Japanese nationals which might not be in keeping with the principle of non-discrimination. It is believed that it is as much in the interest of Japan as of the United States that phraseology be adopted which would avoid any misconstruction being placed upon the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to Japan’s future economic policy in China.

Item 7 “No Annexation” and Item 8 “No Indemnities” of our draft of June 21 are omitted in this new draft. These items are believed to be important to make clear the liberal and progressive spirit underlying the proposed understanding.

Item 9 of our draft of June 21 has been changed to read “Recognition of Manchoukuo”. From the point of view of this Government it would tend to minimize difficulties were the Japanese Government to accept the wording of this item as suggested in our draft of June 21.

Comments on “Oral Memo”

With regard to the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, is it to be understood from the statement that “the Japanese Ambassador has accepted completely the proposals of the Secretary of State regarding troops” that all Japanese troops comprising the occupationary forces are to be withdrawn within a period of two years from the date of the conclusion of the peace settlement and that no troops will after that date be stationed even in North China and Inner Mongolia for defense against communistic activities? If this is so, would it not be desirable, in view of the record relating to the policy to which the Japanese Government has so far adhered in regard to the stationing of troops in North China and Inner Mongolia for defense against communistic activities, to make this decision unmistakably clear in some appropriate form? It is our belief that the accomplishment of the fundamental purposes of the proposed understanding would be facilitated if that understanding upon its announcement should make manifest to the world the mutual desires of Japan and the United States to pursue liberal and progressive policies along peaceful lines. One of the best ways for Japan to contribute to making possible such manifestation would be for Japan to begin immediately with the announcement of agreement of our two Governments to this fundamental understanding, or as soon as possible thereafter, the progressive withdrawal of troops from China. It would also be helpful if the Japanese Government could in its own way indicate to us the general outline of the schedule which the Japanese Government would expect to follow after the reaching of this understanding with the United States for the removal of its expeditionary forces from territories outside the Japanese Empire.

The suggestion is made in the “oral memo” that in relation to the draft exchange of letters concerning the subject matter of Section II (the attitudes of both Governments toward the European war) there be omitted the reference to an address by the Secretary of State defining this Government’s concept of self-defense and that there be substituted an exchange of letters providing that the stipulations of the proposed understanding should not affect the right of self-defense of each party. It is difficult to see how the adoption of this suggestion would be helpful. The right of self-defense is inherent, is exercised unilaterally, and does not require recognition by any other country. It is only because of the provisions of the Tripartite Pact and what have been widely construed as implied threats in repeated statements by Japanese official and unofficial spokesmen that the Tripartite Pact was designed to prevent the entry of the United States into the European war that it seems important for the Japanese Government to give unilaterally some clear indication of its intentions.

With regard to the question of Japanese economic activity in China, it is stated in the “oral memo” received on July 11,¹⁰ that the draft of a letter on this subject presented by the Secretary of State on June 21¹¹ seems to assume continuous overlordship of Japan in China and that it is impossible for the Japanese Ambassador to make specific replies to the questions raised in that draft letter as they affect the sovereignty of a third power. It is difficult to follow the logic of such a contention. The questions in that draft letter have only to do with what Japan intends to ask of China and what Japan intends to do on her own initiative. It is true that Section V of the proposed understanding provides that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on in conformity with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. In the light of the actual situation in the areas of China under Japanese military occupation, however, it is believed that it would contribute toward disarming critics for the Japanese Government to give a clear indication of how it intends to apply in a practical way to its economic activities in China the principle aforementioned. Our draft letter of June 21 was prepared with that end in view and in order that there would be no misunderstanding of what the Japanese Government has in mind.

The last paragraph of the “oral memo” would seem to imply that the author thereof considers that Premier Konoe’s statement of June 29 (interview with a Paramount newsreel correspondent),¹² his reply of July 8¹³ to President Roosevelt’s personal message,¹⁴ and the Japanese Ambassador’s letter of July 4 to the Secretary of State,¹⁵ dispose satisfactorily of the indication contained in the last paragraph of the Secretary of State’s oral statement of June 21¹⁶ that this Government need await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace. We regret that the manifestations of the Japanese Government’s attitude referred to above do not, in our opinion, overcome the presumptions created by evidence which continues to reach this Government of an intention on the part of the Japanese Government to pursue a course inconsistent with the spirit of the proposed understanding.

The Japanese Government has not yet made reply to the questions raised with the Japanese Ambassador on July 5¹⁷ with reference to a Shanghai press report that the Japanese Government had plans for the forceful acquisition of naval and air bases in French Indochina and in Thailand. As regards the reply of Prince Konoe of July 8 to the President’s message in regard to the Japanese Government’s intention with regard to the question of the Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, this reply in our opinion leaves the matter of Japan’s intentions in obscurity.

Other developments in the situation which render a clear-cut manifestation of the Japanese Government’s intentions all the more important and which might prejudice the success of any approach by the American Government to the Chinese Government, as contemplated in the Japanese proposal, are the recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime by the Axis powers, the announcement by the Japanese Government made in connection therewith, the joint announcements by the Japanese Prime Minister and Wang Ching-wei on the occasion of Wang’s recent visit to Japan, and the concrete evidence of Japan’s intention to support Wang afforded by a reported loan by Japan of Yen 300,000,000 to the Nanking regime. In view of these circumstances, it would hardly be a matter for surprise if General Chiang Kai-shek should feel misgivings in regard to Japan’s intentions with respect to the future position of the Chungking Government and should on that account hesitate to entertain a proposal for negotiating a peace settlement with Japan.

It is felt, in view of the foregoing considerations, that discussion of detailed aspects of the proposed understanding could naturally be carried on to better advantage if the Japanese Government should first manifest in its own way definitive indications that it intends to follow peaceful courses.

7. Submitted with covering note dated July 15 that “Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hackworth have not had an opportunity to go over this memorandum and we are handing them copies for their consideration and suggestions for possible revision.”
8. Not printed, but see memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 12, p. 314.
9. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 486.
10. Not printed.
11. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 491.
12. See telegram No. 904, June 30, 8 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 989.
13. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 503.
14. Ibid., p. 502.
15. Ibid., p. 499.
16. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, pp. 485, 486.
17. See memorandum of July 5, 1941, ibid., pp. 499, 501.